Christopher Hitchens is now continually starting to sound like a douchebag:
"In what sense, in other words, does his participation in a shameful war qualify him to be president of the United States? This was a combat of more than 30 years ago, fought with a largely drafted army using indiscriminate tactics and weaponry against a deep-rooted and long-running domestic insurgency. (Agent Orange, for example, was employed to destroy the vegetation in the Mekong Delta and make life easier for the swift boats.) The experience of having fought in such a war is absolutely useless to any American today and has no bearing on any thinkable fight in which the United States could now become engaged.
It's one thing to be a principled contrarian, it's entirely another thing to be a contrarian for the shake of being a contrarian. To be a rootless polemisist: oh what a joy. Hitch is afflicted with an Orwell complex.
Tuesday, August 24, 2004
Monday, August 23, 2004
Get Down!
You've really got to hand it to the Republican slim machine and its numerous appendages. In the span of only four weeks they've managed to shape the new cycle to theirs and the President's benefit. Only two days after the Democratic convention, with Democrats feeling unified by the self-congratulatory gathering, the media digesting the overarching message presented by the Democrats, a funny thing happened: Terror alerts were issued.
The focus directly, and rightly, shifted to the urgency and credibility of these alerts, and away from John Kerry and the recent Democratic convention. Concerned about possible attacks to the homeland, New York and Washington specifically, the Bush administration moved quickly to notify not only first responders, law enforcement officers and public officials, but also the general public. Asked for further evidence of the imminence of the attacks and the veracity of the evidence that led to the Terror alerts, the administration at first balked.
Just days later it was confirmed that the evidence for the suspected attacks predated 9/11, and that a former Al-Qaeda operative, captured in June, and who was providing actionable intelligence for the fight against international terrorism may have been inadvertently outed by Administration officials.
With the media unable to make heads or tails of the muddled circumstances, coverage began to be overwhelmingly dominated by news of important Al-Qaeda captures on all corners of the globe-- and without relent. It became a consecutive crescendo of rising momentum for Bush's re-elect. Contemporaneously, and not all too coincidentally, a shadowy group of scorned Vietnam veterans began a public relations campaign to discredit Kerry's Vietnam record. It didn't matter that these veterans never actually served with John Kerry, or that most of them didn't even contest his Senatorial Campaign in Massachusetts, or that some even endorsed John Kerry in the same Senatorial Campaign, or that their stories contradicted their own sworn testimony; all of this didn't matter.
The media, in the initial days, virtually accepted without reservation the allegations of these veterans, leaving Kerry on the defensive; where he's been for nearly the whole month of August. A visitor from another world would surely think something was wrong with this John Kerry character. With Kerry's negatives rising among veterans, these attack ads by the Swift Boat Vets for Truth have proven to be extremely effective for the Bush Campaign, despite claiming to have no links to the group and at the same time refusing to disavow the ads-- this isn't a disavowal.
Bush is poised to accept his party's nomination on the heels of a relatively empty month. The Republican National Convention seems have to been preceded with the type of news cycle fitting for the Bush presidency: Flaky on the outside, nothing in the middle: Nothing substantial on the obstinacy of the Defense Department, the CIA and the White House with regard to the proposals of the 9/11 commission, nothing substantial on the political dynamic of the fight for Najaf and its possible undermining of Ayad Allawi's power, nothing substantial on the crisis in Dafur, the instability in Afghanistan, the growing number of complicit actors in the prisoner abuse scandal, on the economy, and on the Bush presidency and his record in general.
It makes sense why the Bush administration would have us mired in the intimate details of how superficial Kerry's Vietnam injuries were, and that he only served four months. It makes sense because anything that really matters to the American people and that is crucially relevant to the campaign hurts Bush: The economy, the War on Terror, and the War in Iraq. Bush loses on every front.
The focus directly, and rightly, shifted to the urgency and credibility of these alerts, and away from John Kerry and the recent Democratic convention. Concerned about possible attacks to the homeland, New York and Washington specifically, the Bush administration moved quickly to notify not only first responders, law enforcement officers and public officials, but also the general public. Asked for further evidence of the imminence of the attacks and the veracity of the evidence that led to the Terror alerts, the administration at first balked.
Just days later it was confirmed that the evidence for the suspected attacks predated 9/11, and that a former Al-Qaeda operative, captured in June, and who was providing actionable intelligence for the fight against international terrorism may have been inadvertently outed by Administration officials.
With the media unable to make heads or tails of the muddled circumstances, coverage began to be overwhelmingly dominated by news of important Al-Qaeda captures on all corners of the globe-- and without relent. It became a consecutive crescendo of rising momentum for Bush's re-elect. Contemporaneously, and not all too coincidentally, a shadowy group of scorned Vietnam veterans began a public relations campaign to discredit Kerry's Vietnam record. It didn't matter that these veterans never actually served with John Kerry, or that most of them didn't even contest his Senatorial Campaign in Massachusetts, or that some even endorsed John Kerry in the same Senatorial Campaign, or that their stories contradicted their own sworn testimony; all of this didn't matter.
The media, in the initial days, virtually accepted without reservation the allegations of these veterans, leaving Kerry on the defensive; where he's been for nearly the whole month of August. A visitor from another world would surely think something was wrong with this John Kerry character. With Kerry's negatives rising among veterans, these attack ads by the Swift Boat Vets for Truth have proven to be extremely effective for the Bush Campaign, despite claiming to have no links to the group and at the same time refusing to disavow the ads-- this isn't a disavowal.
Bush is poised to accept his party's nomination on the heels of a relatively empty month. The Republican National Convention seems have to been preceded with the type of news cycle fitting for the Bush presidency: Flaky on the outside, nothing in the middle: Nothing substantial on the obstinacy of the Defense Department, the CIA and the White House with regard to the proposals of the 9/11 commission, nothing substantial on the political dynamic of the fight for Najaf and its possible undermining of Ayad Allawi's power, nothing substantial on the crisis in Dafur, the instability in Afghanistan, the growing number of complicit actors in the prisoner abuse scandal, on the economy, and on the Bush presidency and his record in general.
It makes sense why the Bush administration would have us mired in the intimate details of how superficial Kerry's Vietnam injuries were, and that he only served four months. It makes sense because anything that really matters to the American people and that is crucially relevant to the campaign hurts Bush: The economy, the War on Terror, and the War in Iraq. Bush loses on every front.
Friday, August 20, 2004
In Bad Taste
When I saw this ad, I was overcome with a feeling of confused disgust. I'm not sure whose idea it was, but it just doesn't seem like it would play well with any demographic. It's an obvious message, and a very tacky delivery method; especially during the Olympics. It's no surprise that the ad has the Iraqis up in arms.
If some contend that the American adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq were principled defenses of the homeland and universal human rights-- Afganistan more likely; Iraq still questionably-- then the insincerity of a tacky political ad about this fact only degrades its reality.
Of course Afghanistan and Iraq can't escape the grasp of political opportunism, though one would hope that at least some things aren't politically distorted.
If some contend that the American adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq were principled defenses of the homeland and universal human rights-- Afganistan more likely; Iraq still questionably-- then the insincerity of a tacky political ad about this fact only degrades its reality.
Of course Afghanistan and Iraq can't escape the grasp of political opportunism, though one would hope that at least some things aren't politically distorted.
Wednesday, August 11, 2004
Policy Review
An interesting essay in the Policy Review by Sebastian Mallaby addresses the fundamental policy considerations surrounding the deregulation debate that has been underway for the past 20 years in Western industrial countries. Striking a cautionary tone, and surveying the lay of the land, Mallaby begins thusly:
If we are lucky, a new consensus may form around a slightly different principle: We will celebrate free competition rather than free markets, and we will recognize that promoting competition may frequently require departure from the principle of laissez-faire. If we are less lucky, we may face a more sweeping backlash against enterprise, with high costs to our prosperity
The incredible gains brought about by the deregulation of formerly governmental run industries—like Airline, Transportation, and Telecommunication—have created competitive markets, and inefficient ones, lower prices, and sometimes, more efficient delivery of services. Yet, at the same time, governmental oversight became lax and instances of corporate malfeasances, network collusion, and price gouging started making the logic of deregulation faulty:
The signs of this watershed are scattered, but they are too numerous to ignore. Abroad, we face a broad disaffection with pro-market reformism, which runs from disappointment at privatization and marketization in Russia to the return of leftist populism in Latin America. Within the United States, market advocates have been on the defensive, arguably, since the summer of 2000, when California’s first electricity blackouts called into question the deregulation of the energy sector. Around the same time, the telecommunications sector began its dramatic meltdown, culminating two years later in the bankruptcies of WorldCom, Global Crossing, and more than 150 less famous participants in the experiment unleashed by the 1996 telecoms deregulation law
… All that’s before you consider the twin shocks of terrorism and the outcry over corporate governance following the bankruptcy of Enron. In the aftermath of September 11, Americans turned instinctively to government for solutions — not just to hunt down al Qaeda but also to create the economic adjustments apparently required by the new circumstances.
Although Mallaby has some broader objections to the anti-market movement’s rhetoric—thinking it may, if not intellectually confronted, push for stifling governmental measures against enterprise—he concedes that reform is needed:
In the face of setbacks for markets, from California’s blackouts to the corporate governance scandals, the case in favor of the market needs to be restated vigorously, but it also needs to be defined more carefully than it has been. Pro-market people need to distinguish between issues and industries where an aggressive deregulatory approach is justified and those where this will only backfire. They need to accept that the right policy is often not deregulation but rather smart regulation and that the goal isn’t to cut the number of government rules but to ensure that rules make sense.
Despite flourishes of vacuousness, for instance, saying that the minimum wage laws are bad, the tenor of his essay is reasonable; though, similarly, it is tendentiously conservative. If there is one point that we’d agree on, this would be it:
If pro-market people can become tomorrow’s pro-competition people, they will be free to choose flexibly between markets and government activism, recognizing each as means to the pro-competition end.
If we are lucky, a new consensus may form around a slightly different principle: We will celebrate free competition rather than free markets, and we will recognize that promoting competition may frequently require departure from the principle of laissez-faire. If we are less lucky, we may face a more sweeping backlash against enterprise, with high costs to our prosperity
The incredible gains brought about by the deregulation of formerly governmental run industries—like Airline, Transportation, and Telecommunication—have created competitive markets, and inefficient ones, lower prices, and sometimes, more efficient delivery of services. Yet, at the same time, governmental oversight became lax and instances of corporate malfeasances, network collusion, and price gouging started making the logic of deregulation faulty:
The signs of this watershed are scattered, but they are too numerous to ignore. Abroad, we face a broad disaffection with pro-market reformism, which runs from disappointment at privatization and marketization in Russia to the return of leftist populism in Latin America. Within the United States, market advocates have been on the defensive, arguably, since the summer of 2000, when California’s first electricity blackouts called into question the deregulation of the energy sector. Around the same time, the telecommunications sector began its dramatic meltdown, culminating two years later in the bankruptcies of WorldCom, Global Crossing, and more than 150 less famous participants in the experiment unleashed by the 1996 telecoms deregulation law
… All that’s before you consider the twin shocks of terrorism and the outcry over corporate governance following the bankruptcy of Enron. In the aftermath of September 11, Americans turned instinctively to government for solutions — not just to hunt down al Qaeda but also to create the economic adjustments apparently required by the new circumstances.
Although Mallaby has some broader objections to the anti-market movement’s rhetoric—thinking it may, if not intellectually confronted, push for stifling governmental measures against enterprise—he concedes that reform is needed:
In the face of setbacks for markets, from California’s blackouts to the corporate governance scandals, the case in favor of the market needs to be restated vigorously, but it also needs to be defined more carefully than it has been. Pro-market people need to distinguish between issues and industries where an aggressive deregulatory approach is justified and those where this will only backfire. They need to accept that the right policy is often not deregulation but rather smart regulation and that the goal isn’t to cut the number of government rules but to ensure that rules make sense.
Despite flourishes of vacuousness, for instance, saying that the minimum wage laws are bad, the tenor of his essay is reasonable; though, similarly, it is tendentiously conservative. If there is one point that we’d agree on, this would be it:
If pro-market people can become tomorrow’s pro-competition people, they will be free to choose flexibly between markets and government activism, recognizing each as means to the pro-competition end.
Fail Safe
One of my favorite novels is Fail Safe. A work of political fiction, Fail Safe deals with the strategic maneuverings of Cold War nuclear defense. As a result of human error, US -52 Bombers patrolling the edges of Russian air space receive a coded message instructing them to attack Moscow. Once the Bombers pass the Fail Safe point, now unable to communicate with either the Americans or the Russians, their mission is to drop the payload, an atomic bomb.
The red phones are hot in Moscow and Washington trying to quickly resolve the situation; but, ultimately, the Bombers can't be stopped. It is then agreed that Washington will, in exchange for the imminent Moscow attack, drop a nuclear weapon on New York-- in good faith ( A crazy premise, I know).
So what exactly does this have to do with anything? Well, in an Op-ed in today's New York Times Nicholas D. Kristof speaks to the possibility of a nuclear bomb being detonated in New York city, though not by Americans; but, by terrorist. Take for instance this interesting excerpt:
...on Oct. 11, 2001, exactly a month after 9/11, aides told President Bush that a C.I.A. source code-named Dragonfire had reported that Al Qaeda had obtained a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon and smuggled it into New York City.
The C.I.A. found the report plausible. The weapon had supposedly been stolen from Russia, which indeed has many 10-kiloton weapons. Russia is reported to have lost some of its nuclear materials, and Al Qaeda has mounted a determined effort to get or make such a weapon. And the C.I.A. had picked up Al Qaeda chatter about an "American Hiroshima."
President Bush dispatched nuclear experts to New York to search for the weapon and sent Dick Cheney and other officials out of town to ensure the continuity of government in case a weapon exploded in Washington instead. But to avoid panic, the White House told no one in New York City, not even Mayor Rudy Giuliani.
Dragonfire's report was wrong, but similar reports - that Al Qaeda has its hands on a nuclear weapon from the former Soviet Union - have regularly surfaced in the intelligence community, even though such a report has never been confirmed. We do know several troubling things: Al Qaeda negotiated for a $1.5 million purchase of uranium (apparently of South African origin) from a retired Sudanese cabinet minister; its envoys traveled repeatedly to Central Asia to buy weapons-grade nuclear materials; and Osama bin Laden's top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, boasted, "We sent our people to Moscow, to Tashkent, to other Central Asian states, and they negotiated, and we purchased some suitcase [nuclear] bombs."
This is, seriously, some scary stuff. If international terror organizations, with designs of annihilating a major American metropolis, got their hands on nuclear weapons, it difficult to see how the American government would be able to defend Americans against that type of attack.
Some grim estimates see the likelihood of an attack of that scale and magnitude on the near horizon: A 50% chance within in the next 10 years. Steps can be taken to minimize the likelihood of such an attack, however. Counter-proliferation and non-proliferation policy must be indefatigably pursued, and situations like Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan can't happen—period.
The red phones are hot in Moscow and Washington trying to quickly resolve the situation; but, ultimately, the Bombers can't be stopped. It is then agreed that Washington will, in exchange for the imminent Moscow attack, drop a nuclear weapon on New York-- in good faith ( A crazy premise, I know).
So what exactly does this have to do with anything? Well, in an Op-ed in today's New York Times Nicholas D. Kristof speaks to the possibility of a nuclear bomb being detonated in New York city, though not by Americans; but, by terrorist. Take for instance this interesting excerpt:
...on Oct. 11, 2001, exactly a month after 9/11, aides told President Bush that a C.I.A. source code-named Dragonfire had reported that Al Qaeda had obtained a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon and smuggled it into New York City.
The C.I.A. found the report plausible. The weapon had supposedly been stolen from Russia, which indeed has many 10-kiloton weapons. Russia is reported to have lost some of its nuclear materials, and Al Qaeda has mounted a determined effort to get or make such a weapon. And the C.I.A. had picked up Al Qaeda chatter about an "American Hiroshima."
President Bush dispatched nuclear experts to New York to search for the weapon and sent Dick Cheney and other officials out of town to ensure the continuity of government in case a weapon exploded in Washington instead. But to avoid panic, the White House told no one in New York City, not even Mayor Rudy Giuliani.
Dragonfire's report was wrong, but similar reports - that Al Qaeda has its hands on a nuclear weapon from the former Soviet Union - have regularly surfaced in the intelligence community, even though such a report has never been confirmed. We do know several troubling things: Al Qaeda negotiated for a $1.5 million purchase of uranium (apparently of South African origin) from a retired Sudanese cabinet minister; its envoys traveled repeatedly to Central Asia to buy weapons-grade nuclear materials; and Osama bin Laden's top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, boasted, "We sent our people to Moscow, to Tashkent, to other Central Asian states, and they negotiated, and we purchased some suitcase [nuclear] bombs."
This is, seriously, some scary stuff. If international terror organizations, with designs of annihilating a major American metropolis, got their hands on nuclear weapons, it difficult to see how the American government would be able to defend Americans against that type of attack.
Some grim estimates see the likelihood of an attack of that scale and magnitude on the near horizon: A 50% chance within in the next 10 years. Steps can be taken to minimize the likelihood of such an attack, however. Counter-proliferation and non-proliferation policy must be indefatigably pursued, and situations like Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan can't happen—period.
Chicken, Beef, or Human Flesh?
This story on CNN.com freaked me out. A man who accidentally tripped into the Bride at a wedding reception was attacked by the bride’s father and other family members, taken out to a remote area, killed, cooked with coconut leaves and kerosene, and—to stretch this story beyond fiction—taken back to the reception in pieces and fed to the unknowing guests. Note to self: avoid weddings reception in the Philippines
Tuesday, August 10, 2004
Some Civility, Please?
Guess who's filing a civil suit against Kobe Bryant? No, not Shaq? And no, not the City of Los Angeles, though in many respects they could prove harm inflicted in a court of law on account of how poorly the Lakers played in the Finals. But seriously, guess who? Yes, Jane Doe, the woman accusing Bryant of sexual assault is now simultaneously pursing a civil suit against him.
Keep in mind that this should not, in any measure, detract from the merit of her claim that she's not in it for financial gain. The woman contends that she has suffered "public scorn, hatred and ridicule" from the ongoing court proceedings. Although to be fair, a number of accidental-- in the loosest sense of the word-- leaks have shamelessly revealed salacious pieces of information that the Judge promised to keep confidential. Because the burden of proof is higher in a criminal case, the prosecution likely advised the accuser that a civil case—with a lower threshold of proof—would be in her best (monetary) interest.
Therefore, because the standard of proof is far lower in a civil case, this veiled threat by the prosecution portends the type of evidence they'll be citing: “The attorneys also accused Bryant of ``attempting to commit similar acts of violent sexual assault on females he has just met,'' but they did not elaborate. So expect everything and the kitchen sinks to be thrown in as evidence displaying Bryant's pattern of aggressive sexual behavior.
Conventional wisdom says Kobe settles out of court, for fear of having a queue of women willing to testify, for the prosecution, on his pattern of aggressive sexual behavior-- immaterial to the case though they may be.
Needless to say, Kobe Bryant’s name will be, for now and evermore, synonymous with rape, whether or not anything actually happened that night. If you don't believe this, I only have one question for you: Does anyone really name their child Orenthal James anymore?
Keep in mind that this should not, in any measure, detract from the merit of her claim that she's not in it for financial gain. The woman contends that she has suffered "public scorn, hatred and ridicule" from the ongoing court proceedings. Although to be fair, a number of accidental-- in the loosest sense of the word-- leaks have shamelessly revealed salacious pieces of information that the Judge promised to keep confidential. Because the burden of proof is higher in a criminal case, the prosecution likely advised the accuser that a civil case—with a lower threshold of proof—would be in her best (monetary) interest.
Therefore, because the standard of proof is far lower in a civil case, this veiled threat by the prosecution portends the type of evidence they'll be citing: “The attorneys also accused Bryant of ``attempting to commit similar acts of violent sexual assault on females he has just met,'' but they did not elaborate. So expect everything and the kitchen sinks to be thrown in as evidence displaying Bryant's pattern of aggressive sexual behavior.
Conventional wisdom says Kobe settles out of court, for fear of having a queue of women willing to testify, for the prosecution, on his pattern of aggressive sexual behavior-- immaterial to the case though they may be.
Needless to say, Kobe Bryant’s name will be, for now and evermore, synonymous with rape, whether or not anything actually happened that night. If you don't believe this, I only have one question for you: Does anyone really name their child Orenthal James anymore?
Huh?
I'd question the methodology of this, but since it reflects beautifully on Canada, I don't think I will. Apparently, in a survey of the best cities to live in, for expatriates, and measured to the relative quality of life and cost of living, five of the top six cities are Canadian.
This doesn't necessarily fly in the face of logic, since prominent international cities like New York, Tokyo, London and Paris are incredibly expensive to live in. And of the 200 cities the list surveyed, New York, Tokyo, London and Paris didn't even make the cut.
So who was number one, you ask? Well, none other than Canada's capital, Ottawa. Which helps me put things into perspective: for the quality of life I'm afforded, maybe the cost of living isn't terribly high; but, then again, perception and reality aren't too often comparable.
The other Canadian cities, in descending order, are Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal, and Toronto in sixth. However one may read into these findings, I think it’s safe to say that Montreal must be the coolest cheapest city in the world—for expatriates, that is.
This doesn't necessarily fly in the face of logic, since prominent international cities like New York, Tokyo, London and Paris are incredibly expensive to live in. And of the 200 cities the list surveyed, New York, Tokyo, London and Paris didn't even make the cut.
So who was number one, you ask? Well, none other than Canada's capital, Ottawa. Which helps me put things into perspective: for the quality of life I'm afforded, maybe the cost of living isn't terribly high; but, then again, perception and reality aren't too often comparable.
The other Canadian cities, in descending order, are Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal, and Toronto in sixth. However one may read into these findings, I think it’s safe to say that Montreal must be the coolest cheapest city in the world—for expatriates, that is.
Monday, August 09, 2004
Quantum Information Systems
I just read a very interesting piece over at ScientificAmerican.com on the new science of Quantum Information. What this new science essentially aims to facilitate is the exponential increase in the speed of information processing. Thus, quantum information examines the universe of quantum interactions in order to explain how they relate to classical explanations of thermodynamics and entropy.
Where Classical Physics and Quantum Mechanics have diverged is in their ability to make sense of each other. The perceptibility and predictability of the physical world allows for a somewhat palpable understanding of our physical laws. Though, at a smaller quantum level, the coherence of the physical world becomes highly variable, unquantifiable, and volatile.
Quantum Mechanics has attempted to explain various quantum states, though only in abstracted settings—such as isolated atoms. Although still theoretical, Quantum Information science posits that the ability to control, arrange, and distribute quanta in an information system—or in any system, for that matter—may dramatically increase the speed with which information is processed.
This, to be sure, means the possible creation of incredible super-computers that would be able to do computations far faster than current computers-- so much so, that what may take computers now days and months to compute, would take these super-computers milliseconds. These are the possible operating principles:
1. Identify a physical resource. A familiar classical example is a string of bits. Although bits are often thought of as abstract entities--0's and 1's--all information is inevitably encoded in real physical objects, and thus a string of bits should be regarded as a physical resource.
2. Identify an information-processing task that can be performed using the physical resource of step 1. A classical example is the two-part task of compressing the output from an information source (for example, the text in a book) into a bit string and then decompressing it--that is, recovering the original information from the compressed bit string.
3. Identify a criterion for successful completion of the task of step 2. In our example, the criterion could be that the output from the decompression stage perfectly matches the input to the compression stage.
Another interesting application of the Science of Quantum Mechanics is Error Correction. Telling time is no doubt an imprecise science, given that various distortions of a physical variety perturb the fluidity of our actual measurements. However, there may be an answer to this problem:
Quantum error-correcting codes are a triumph of science. Something that brilliant people thought could not be done--protecting quantum states against the effects of noise--was accomplished using a combination of concepts from information science and basic quantum mechanics.
What Thermodynamics did for the steam engine in the 18th and 19th century, Quantum Mechanics can do for computer systems, information technology, and complex systems in the 21st and 22nd century--and beyond.
Where Classical Physics and Quantum Mechanics have diverged is in their ability to make sense of each other. The perceptibility and predictability of the physical world allows for a somewhat palpable understanding of our physical laws. Though, at a smaller quantum level, the coherence of the physical world becomes highly variable, unquantifiable, and volatile.
Quantum Mechanics has attempted to explain various quantum states, though only in abstracted settings—such as isolated atoms. Although still theoretical, Quantum Information science posits that the ability to control, arrange, and distribute quanta in an information system—or in any system, for that matter—may dramatically increase the speed with which information is processed.
This, to be sure, means the possible creation of incredible super-computers that would be able to do computations far faster than current computers-- so much so, that what may take computers now days and months to compute, would take these super-computers milliseconds. These are the possible operating principles:
1. Identify a physical resource. A familiar classical example is a string of bits. Although bits are often thought of as abstract entities--0's and 1's--all information is inevitably encoded in real physical objects, and thus a string of bits should be regarded as a physical resource.
2. Identify an information-processing task that can be performed using the physical resource of step 1. A classical example is the two-part task of compressing the output from an information source (for example, the text in a book) into a bit string and then decompressing it--that is, recovering the original information from the compressed bit string.
3. Identify a criterion for successful completion of the task of step 2. In our example, the criterion could be that the output from the decompression stage perfectly matches the input to the compression stage.
Another interesting application of the Science of Quantum Mechanics is Error Correction. Telling time is no doubt an imprecise science, given that various distortions of a physical variety perturb the fluidity of our actual measurements. However, there may be an answer to this problem:
Quantum error-correcting codes are a triumph of science. Something that brilliant people thought could not be done--protecting quantum states against the effects of noise--was accomplished using a combination of concepts from information science and basic quantum mechanics.
What Thermodynamics did for the steam engine in the 18th and 19th century, Quantum Mechanics can do for computer systems, information technology, and complex systems in the 21st and 22nd century--and beyond.
Big Get
Rarely do fake-news organizations get the "big get"-- a former President. Fox got Bush 41 and now The Daily Show with Jon Stewart is getting Bill Clinton. Political satire and a Former U.S president makes for good Monday night theater of the absurd.
Al-Sadar at it Again
Aftering being forced into a cease fire back in June, Muqtada al-Sadr is back at it again. Over three hundred militamen have been killed in The last five days of heavy fighting in the city of Najaf. Ayad Allawi visited Najaf on Sunday calling on an end to the fighting between al-Sadr's militants and U.S forces. However, al-Sadr maintained his intransigency:“I will continue fighting,” he told reporters. “I will remain in Najaf city until the last drop of my blood has been spilled.”
Unfortunately, al-Sadr isn't even willing to consider a negotiated settlement, which could become problematic for U.S forces. al-Sadr's men are disproportionately matched against U.S forces, leading to the general perception of a bloodbath in Najaf. In the process, the Holy city of Najaf is being obliterated, spraking discomfort in some elements of the Shiite majority-- this isn't even to speak of the loss of innocent lives.
The effect this is having, an unwelcome one at that, is that U.S forces seem to be stalemated: The more they persue al-Sadr, the more they destroy the city of Najar and embolden sympathetic Shiites. However, al-Sadr is an opportunistic lout only interested in a cynical power grab. That a majority of Shiites find his continual churlishness unproductive to the cause of a stable and prosperous Iraq is not surprising.
Even if U.S forces wanted to extract al-Sadr, it would come at too great a cost. So for now, even though fighting persists, U.S forces will be restrained in the action they take in Najaf--stalemated, for now.
Unfortunately, al-Sadr isn't even willing to consider a negotiated settlement, which could become problematic for U.S forces. al-Sadr's men are disproportionately matched against U.S forces, leading to the general perception of a bloodbath in Najaf. In the process, the Holy city of Najaf is being obliterated, spraking discomfort in some elements of the Shiite majority-- this isn't even to speak of the loss of innocent lives.
The effect this is having, an unwelcome one at that, is that U.S forces seem to be stalemated: The more they persue al-Sadr, the more they destroy the city of Najar and embolden sympathetic Shiites. However, al-Sadr is an opportunistic lout only interested in a cynical power grab. That a majority of Shiites find his continual churlishness unproductive to the cause of a stable and prosperous Iraq is not surprising.
Even if U.S forces wanted to extract al-Sadr, it would come at too great a cost. So for now, even though fighting persists, U.S forces will be restrained in the action they take in Najaf--stalemated, for now.
Sunday, August 08, 2004
Terror
Over at Majikthise, in response to Kevin Drum and Philosoraptor's anger over a few liberals criticizing the administration's terror alert, an excellent point is made:
I disagree that liberals acted irresponsibly. There were good reasons to question the sincerity of the terror alert. First, the evidence they presented was weak. When challenged they fleshed it out, still falling short of a rationale for a upping the terror threat. Criticizing a terror threat has both risks and benefits. Liberals know that if they don't criticize suspicious terror threats, the Bush administration will be tempted to politicize future alerts. A loyal but vigorous opposition imposes costs on the terror threat, deterring the administration from issuing dubious threats in the future. By contrast, liberal self-censorship would give the Republicans a unfair advantage in a brutal election year. This administration hasn't earned the benefit of the doubt. When their claims don't stand up to scrutiny, we have an obligation to say so. The public has a right to know when large segments of the population have ceased to believe the most solemn pronouncements of the Commander in Chief. If we all conceal our doubts for some greater good, we will perpetuate the false impressionthat we trust Bush and perpetuate the myth that he can still govern effectively. This administration has so thoroughly betrayed our trust by politicizing everything from pre-war intelligence to AIDS prevention that it can no longer exact our trust. It has undermined its own efficacy and it is our duty to say so.
I disagree that liberals acted irresponsibly. There were good reasons to question the sincerity of the terror alert. First, the evidence they presented was weak. When challenged they fleshed it out, still falling short of a rationale for a upping the terror threat. Criticizing a terror threat has both risks and benefits. Liberals know that if they don't criticize suspicious terror threats, the Bush administration will be tempted to politicize future alerts. A loyal but vigorous opposition imposes costs on the terror threat, deterring the administration from issuing dubious threats in the future. By contrast, liberal self-censorship would give the Republicans a unfair advantage in a brutal election year. This administration hasn't earned the benefit of the doubt. When their claims don't stand up to scrutiny, we have an obligation to say so. The public has a right to know when large segments of the population have ceased to believe the most solemn pronouncements of the Commander in Chief. If we all conceal our doubts for some greater good, we will perpetuate the false impressionthat we trust Bush and perpetuate the myth that he can still govern effectively. This administration has so thoroughly betrayed our trust by politicizing everything from pre-war intelligence to AIDS prevention that it can no longer exact our trust. It has undermined its own efficacy and it is our duty to say so.
The Epistemology of Rape
Majikthise makes some cogent points about the epistemology of rape, though, there is one I have a hard time understanding. First, I can't see how the defendant’s inference of the sexual promiscuity/history of an accuser matters at the time of said act. The defendant certainly doesn’t have access to the accuser’s sexual history right up before or during the act—if we’re talking about acquaintance rape—so the inference made doesn’t matter much. The problem arises when conflicting stories about the sexual act pit the word of the accuser against that of the defendant.
The defender justifies his act by saying, in effect, “the impression I received that night from the accuser lead me to infer that she was interested in a sexual engagement” (consent). Why is there a need for true justified belief in this situation? And can that ever be possible? The accuser can rightly counter that no such inference could have been drawn from her actions that night and that the sexual engagement was unwanted (no consent).
Since the burden of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution must prove that not only was the defendant’s inference of consent erroneous, but that also the defendant had willful intent to rape the accuser. This is where physical evidence becomes determinative of intent (most of the time) and consent (sometimes).
For example, Kobe Bryant’s accuser had sexual engagements with two other men 42 hours after her encounter with Bryant, and before a thorough sexual examination. Therefore, any harm during 42 to 72 hours after her sexual encounter with Kobe becomes difficult to attribute to Kobe alone, since the sexual exam was done after all these sexual encounters. The prosecution will not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the accuser’s claim that the sex was not consensual because the physical evidence is inconclusive.
This is not to say that the accuser’s allegations are false, just that, considering the indeterminacy of the physical evidence, and the inability to definitively know what happened that night, the jury would be inclined to acquit Bryant. That is one reason why the accuser is dropping the case.
The defender justifies his act by saying, in effect, “the impression I received that night from the accuser lead me to infer that she was interested in a sexual engagement” (consent). Why is there a need for true justified belief in this situation? And can that ever be possible? The accuser can rightly counter that no such inference could have been drawn from her actions that night and that the sexual engagement was unwanted (no consent).
Since the burden of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution must prove that not only was the defendant’s inference of consent erroneous, but that also the defendant had willful intent to rape the accuser. This is where physical evidence becomes determinative of intent (most of the time) and consent (sometimes).
For example, Kobe Bryant’s accuser had sexual engagements with two other men 42 hours after her encounter with Bryant, and before a thorough sexual examination. Therefore, any harm during 42 to 72 hours after her sexual encounter with Kobe becomes difficult to attribute to Kobe alone, since the sexual exam was done after all these sexual encounters. The prosecution will not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the accuser’s claim that the sex was not consensual because the physical evidence is inconclusive.
This is not to say that the accuser’s allegations are false, just that, considering the indeterminacy of the physical evidence, and the inability to definitively know what happened that night, the jury would be inclined to acquit Bryant. That is one reason why the accuser is dropping the case.
The Bourne Supremacy
I just finished watching the The Bourne Supremacy and all I have to say is: Wow. Even having not seen the first one, The Bourne Identity, this didn't detract in any way from the qaulity of Supremacy. The movie, based on Robert Ludlow's Bourne series, catchs up with Jason Bourne in India, where he's trying to piece together his mysterious past. The drama begins when Bourne's fringerprints are found at a murder/heist in Berlin, involving the death of a CIA agent. With this lead, the CIA begins searching for Bourne, who, ironically, also starts searching for CIA agents he thinks have found him out. It turns out, however, that a nefarious character planted Bourne's fingerprints at the crime scene. But, no matter, Bourne is out for revenge and he will not be stoped.
Before giving away too much, I should note that the plausiblity of the CIA being duped by false evidence may have, in the past, been a tough line to swallow. Though in light of recent world events, the story line tended to jive with conventional wisdom. It wasn't too strenuous an exercise in suspension of disbelief.
Strong points of the movie were its cast, photography, musical arrangement and tempo. The one weak point, for me, at least, was it concluded rather abruptly: I wanted more movie! And, unless Ludlow is busying himself writing a third installment to the series, this appears to be the last one. But I guess there's always 24.
Before giving away too much, I should note that the plausiblity of the CIA being duped by false evidence may have, in the past, been a tough line to swallow. Though in light of recent world events, the story line tended to jive with conventional wisdom. It wasn't too strenuous an exercise in suspension of disbelief.
Strong points of the movie were its cast, photography, musical arrangement and tempo. The one weak point, for me, at least, was it concluded rather abruptly: I wanted more movie! And, unless Ludlow is busying himself writing a third installment to the series, this appears to be the last one. But I guess there's always 24.
Saturday, August 07, 2004
Strange Days
Over at Majikthise, via MSNBC, we learn why no one believed chicken little when he bemoaned the falling of the sky. Apparently the Orange Alert was preceded by no credible evidence, or at least any recent intelligence, so the administration, after being understandably pressured to show stronger justification for the Alert, outed a double agent. The double agent was Mohammad Naeem Noor Khan, an al-Qaida member captured in July by Pakistani intelligence and now working with US intelligence to infiltrate al-Qaida. It is not yet know how the New York Times acquired Khan's name by Monday, however; but the Bush administration confirmed Khan's identity with other news organizations.
So it appears that after the terror alert issued Sunday by the Department of Homeland Security, The New York Times publish Khan's name--information they likely acquired eariler since Khan was caputered in July-- assuming that he may have been the reason for the Terror Alert. What the Times hadn't know was that Khan had been working as a double agent for US intelligence, and that they had just comprimised him.
The Times operated under the assumption, rightly, that the terror alert was credible, and that Khan was likely the source. This begs the question: Why would the Admistration comprimse its own source? Simple answer: they didn't intend to. They possibly weren't aware that Khan's name was on the grid. It's clear that the terror warning was bogus, so the Administration had to show evidence that it wasn't, thus outing a July caputre--who was helping them, no less. What this meant was that now British Intelligence had to move quickly against the suspects Khan had helped put under surveillance. Kevin Drum says it better:
What in God's green earth is going on here? I have a whole stew of reactions swirling around in my head about this. I'm beside myself that Bush administration officials are so spineless that they'd kill an undercover operation just to remove some political heat from themselves. But: I'm also angry that the reaction to Sunday's terror warning from Bush critics was so hysterical that the Bushies got panicked into doing this. And yet: I'm furious that Bush and his cronies have so corrupted our intelligence services that deep skepticism was hardly an unfair reaction. But: why did Tom Ridge insist on politicizing Sunday's news in the first place? On the other hand: why did the New York Times print this? Did they know they were blowing an operation?
It's a complicated story right now; but it seems like a simple explanation can be given: Who's working hard to destroy America? Let's hopes the Bush administration didn't botch this one.
Thursday, August 05, 2004
Bushisms
Bush may be remembered as a President whose linguistic ineptitude conveyed a folksy charm, so endearing as to make him accessible to the electorate writ large. Much like his father’s tortured syntax, Bush happens to suffer from the same embarrassing handle of the English language. Today, Bush outdid himself. Speaking to a gathering of military civilians, Bush used a bit of parallelism to get across his message to the terrorist—a bit of parallelism that was expressed incredibly poorly:
Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we. They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country and our people, and neither do we.
Call it a Freudian slip, expressing what his Super Ego consciously felt his current administration was doing to America. Ironically, Bush unintentionally told the truth.
For more Bushisms go here.
Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we. They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country and our people, and neither do we.
Call it a Freudian slip, expressing what his Super Ego consciously felt his current administration was doing to America. Ironically, Bush unintentionally told the truth.
For more Bushisms go here.
Thursday, July 29, 2004
House of Bush, House of Saud
Politics rarely has a dearth of partisanship. Even when times are good and there seems to be no unifying focus for political parties, partisanship becomes gratuitous. The booming 90’s of the Clinton administration strongly attest to that fact. Whitewater, Travel-gate, and, more prominently, the Monica Lewinsky imbroglio, among others, are illustrative of the length to which excessive partisanship impedes sound, sober analysis. Moreover, these partisan excursions, some with merit, though a great many without, show how incredibly dangerous a lack of political focus can affect a country. While a vapid pantomime played its self out on the world stage during the late 90’s, sulking in the backdrop, and dutifully rehearsing act II, was Osama bin Laden and his foot soldiers of Jihad. After introducing himself and his cadre of Islamist fundamentalist to the world on September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden has managed to change the rules of the game, thus shaking the operating dynamics of the West. Yet partisanship still persists in both its good and deleterious forms.
On the other side of the aisles, now, are the Democrats. In an almost Renaissance—though clearly in a vulgar sense—the Democratic/Liberal intelligentsia is engaging itself in debate, sometimes civil, yet most often heated, about the relevance and principles of the Progressive movement and, subsequently, the direction of the Country. Similar to the Conservatives who found themselves bereft of the executive for two Clinton Administrations--however much worse because both houses of Congress are in GOP control-- Liberals, Progressive, and Democrats alike have too much time on their hands to either chase after conspiratorial and blatantly partisan stories or formulate, articulate, and propagate a vision of where they think the country should be headed. The acuity of these variables has only been intensified as the presidential election approaches.
Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right, Big Lies: The Right-Wing Propaganda Machine and How it Distorts the Truth, and Bushwhacked: Life in George W. Bush’s America are just a few of the titles you’ll see gracing shelves at your local bookstore. Political discourse, especially criticism of the Bush administration, has been busting at the seams with deleterious partisanship. Where this critique has discredited itself by imitating all that it criticizes, it has also, on rare occasions, moved beyond the tired paradigm and offered intelligent, evocative dissent. One such critique is Craig Unger’s House of Bush, House of Saud.
Craig Unger, former deputy editor of the New York Observer, is an investigative journalist who has written on the Bushes before. House of Bush, House of Saud meticulously delves into the mostly ambiguous financial dealings between the Bush family, George H. W. and George W, and their associates, former Secretary of State James Baker, Vice President Dick Cheney and a slew of others, and the House of Saud, the Saudi Royal Family and their associates, the Saudi business elite and, ominously, the bin Laden family. Unger’s aim is to put flesh to the skeletal of the whole sordid and mysterious relationship, attempting to show, at the same time, that this relationship has “… helped trigger the Age of Terror and give rise to the tragedy of 9/11.”
Unger’s book is excellently sourced and vividly smooth in its prose, following a well constructed timeline of the evolution of this relationship and presidential politics and foreign policy in the US. As a muscular journalistic polemic the book has its moments. But, on measure, the argument Unger posits rests on too many, though probable, unwarranted assumptions.
Thus, although House of Bush, House of Saud is a gripping and suspenseful narrative that deals, chronologically with the convoluted financial relationship between the House of Bush and the House of Saud and its effect on US foreign policy in general and US-Saudi relations specifically, it fail where it intends to succeed, and unintentionally succeed where it shouldn’t. I will expand on this further by, first, looking at the some of the inferences that Unger draws from his admittedly shaky assumptions, and, second, by noting areas that Unger could have explored at greater length.
On Valentine’s Day in 1945, the president of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia to set in motion what would be a long standing mutual relationship between the two countries. The Saudis needed security, which, in the aftermath of World War two reconstructions, the US was becoming a pre-eminent provider of, and the US needed oil, a resource the Saudis had in abundance. This is a relationship that has endured a lot; but, it is also a relationship that has as it sole quality: strategic interests.
This being said, one of the assumptions that Unger’s argument relies on is the notion that this strategic relationship, though seemingly untenable now, has somehow always been unnecessary. Unger does this through example of the Bush family, or the House of Bush. The evidence Unger brings to bear with respect to Bush Sr. and his relationship with the House of Saud is tangential at best and unremarkable in the main.
After Bush sold his stake in Zapata, his oil company, he entered the realm of politics, a decision that had more to do with deference to his father than purely an ambitious power grab. What’s interesting is that Bush Sr. received more help from the Kuwaiti government at the time than from the House of Saud. It is true, however, that it wasn’t until Bush Sr. started rising in political visibility that financial suitors took notice, especially Saudi financial. Unger points out the canny nature of the Saudis’ goal of securing their political desires in this passage:
Like the Israelis, The Saudis had one overwhelming need that they sought in this new alliance—defense. For all its newfound wealth the House of Saud was more vulnerable militarily than ever… the Saudis sought strong political ties to the United States through personal friendships with the powers that be… To many Americans, the Saudi investments with politicians seemed unsavory, though it was not always precisely clear why. The most obvious assumption was that Saudis were trying to buy access to the White House or to influence policy toward Israel—or against it.
What appears at first as flagrant disregard for American interest turns out to simply be systemic. The Saudis or the House of Saud consistently “buy access” through bailing out and financially aiding associates of political prominent figures.
This apparently was the case with Jimmy Carter’s close ally Bert Lance, who upon resigning at OMB(Office of Management and Budget) was helped out financially through some questionable transactions from the BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International), a shadowy merchant bank founded by Agha Hasan Abedi, a Pakistani with close ties to the Saudi royals.
BCCI was alleged to have dealings in money laundering, the arms and drug trade. It’s a wonder that such a bank was freely operating in the US—let alone with reputable standing among Washington’s political class. It is no surprise that BCCI would also figure into the murky world of oil and politics in Saudi Arabia and America.
Unger, though it is conceded to begin with, fails to qualify one obvious counter-argument: That is, the relationship between the House of Saud and the House of Bush is more a function of American dependency on oil and Texas expertise in oil exploration particularly, as well as Saudi desire to position themselves with the political elite. These conditions created a perfect cocktail wherein the perception of growing political power, with the Bush family, only attracted the attention of the Saudis. And, in turn, once this loose relationship was formed, a nasty feed back loop created privilege, patronage, and patrimony.
Geography is destiny, and never were two institutions more congruent than this.
As this relationship pertains to foreign policy, again Unger misses the point—or at least doesn’t give all too convincing an argument. That the dynamics of international politics in the Middle East during the decade of the Soviet-Afghan war created the framework from which Islamic fundamentalist grew is not in doubt. But whether it was causally related to Bush Sr. relationship with the House of Saud is an entirely different contention. This does seem to be the implication in Unger’s tone, yet he arrives about it in a roundabout way.
A policy to roll back the Soviets from Afghanistan found its origins in the Carter Administration. Zbignew Brezenski, Carter’s National Security Advisor at the time, believed that supplying insurgent guerillas, notably the Eastern Alliance, with arms and intelligence would draw Soviet troops into Afghanistan, creating a war of attrition that would surely demoralize the Soviets. This policy was carried through to the fist Reagan-Bush Administration, although the intensity was ratcheted up. In order to finance this policy, Saudi Arabia became the intermediary, funneling cash and arms to the Islamist fighters eager to protect Muslim land.
The Afghan-Soviet war, subsequently, not only became an ideological and military proxy war that helped defeat Soviet communism, it also became a breeding ground for idealist young Muslims who disdained modernity. One of those young idealistic Muslims was Osama Bin Laden, however. As the United State poised its self to become the only legitimate super power in what was gradually looking like a unipolar world, the strategic exigencies of financing Islamists during the Afghan-Soviet war would turn out create a monster of their own making.
But, try as he might, Unger is unable to persuasively make the case that ex post facto that that strategic gamble wasn’t in the best security interest of the United States, at the time. Further, endemic in the foreign policy constraints of the US is there ability to project power to the extent to which it will not endanger there strategic interest, namely oil. Even as regards the first Gulf war, strategic interests shifted making Saddam Hussein a liability, when only 10 years prior he was an ally against Iran. It may be with equal proportion the extent to which Osama bin Laden abhors the Saudi Royals and the West, the United States specifically. But to say, even imply that in any way the House of Bush as a causal factor in creating the ferocity of Osama bin Laden is tortured logic. Post hoc, ergo Propter hoc is a fallacy often committed when looking for causal blame to assign.
A myriad of variables created the type of Terror practiced by Osama bin Laden. And the House of Saudi is, I think, largely to blame. The United States, as an entity, operates in such a way that its interests are always protected, much like any other state. The exception with the United States is that because of its unrivaled military strengths it can compel other weaker states to act against their interests, while, at the same time, fulfilling theirs. The relationship with the House of Bush and the House of Saud clearly looks sinister, though Unger gives the relationship too much credit.
Unger does, however, manage to produce a pithy and comprehensible account of the short history leading up to 9/11. With twists and turns, House of Bush, House of Saud raises far more questions than it answers. For example, why were140 Saudi Arabians allowed to fly out of the United States, without seriously being questioned, shortly after 9/11? Is James Baker a more nefarious character in this drama than either Bush Sr. or Bush Jr.? Was Osama bin laden really behind the downing of the Black Hawk in Somalia?
These are all interesting questions with which, I think, Unger should have dealt with more. But were Unger is to be commended is in his investigative breadth. He was able to cull together disparate governmental documents, old interviews, policy papers, financial disclosure forms and construct a cogent story about the pre-9/11 variables that helped bring about the post-9/11 world.
Unger attempts to forward a foreign policy critique but isn’t able to consider the constraints on policy makers. The main thrust of his book forwards the thesis that the relationship between the House of Bush and the House of Saud has in some way deliberately created the circumstances in which we find ourselves today. This is far too ambitious a thesis which neglects the real foreign policy imperatives and constraints.
Nonetheless, on balance, Unger’s book is absent of the type of partisanship that muddles honest critique.
On the other side of the aisles, now, are the Democrats. In an almost Renaissance—though clearly in a vulgar sense—the Democratic/Liberal intelligentsia is engaging itself in debate, sometimes civil, yet most often heated, about the relevance and principles of the Progressive movement and, subsequently, the direction of the Country. Similar to the Conservatives who found themselves bereft of the executive for two Clinton Administrations--however much worse because both houses of Congress are in GOP control-- Liberals, Progressive, and Democrats alike have too much time on their hands to either chase after conspiratorial and blatantly partisan stories or formulate, articulate, and propagate a vision of where they think the country should be headed. The acuity of these variables has only been intensified as the presidential election approaches.
Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right, Big Lies: The Right-Wing Propaganda Machine and How it Distorts the Truth, and Bushwhacked: Life in George W. Bush’s America are just a few of the titles you’ll see gracing shelves at your local bookstore. Political discourse, especially criticism of the Bush administration, has been busting at the seams with deleterious partisanship. Where this critique has discredited itself by imitating all that it criticizes, it has also, on rare occasions, moved beyond the tired paradigm and offered intelligent, evocative dissent. One such critique is Craig Unger’s House of Bush, House of Saud.
Craig Unger, former deputy editor of the New York Observer, is an investigative journalist who has written on the Bushes before. House of Bush, House of Saud meticulously delves into the mostly ambiguous financial dealings between the Bush family, George H. W. and George W, and their associates, former Secretary of State James Baker, Vice President Dick Cheney and a slew of others, and the House of Saud, the Saudi Royal Family and their associates, the Saudi business elite and, ominously, the bin Laden family. Unger’s aim is to put flesh to the skeletal of the whole sordid and mysterious relationship, attempting to show, at the same time, that this relationship has “… helped trigger the Age of Terror and give rise to the tragedy of 9/11.”
Unger’s book is excellently sourced and vividly smooth in its prose, following a well constructed timeline of the evolution of this relationship and presidential politics and foreign policy in the US. As a muscular journalistic polemic the book has its moments. But, on measure, the argument Unger posits rests on too many, though probable, unwarranted assumptions.
Thus, although House of Bush, House of Saud is a gripping and suspenseful narrative that deals, chronologically with the convoluted financial relationship between the House of Bush and the House of Saud and its effect on US foreign policy in general and US-Saudi relations specifically, it fail where it intends to succeed, and unintentionally succeed where it shouldn’t. I will expand on this further by, first, looking at the some of the inferences that Unger draws from his admittedly shaky assumptions, and, second, by noting areas that Unger could have explored at greater length.
On Valentine’s Day in 1945, the president of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia to set in motion what would be a long standing mutual relationship between the two countries. The Saudis needed security, which, in the aftermath of World War two reconstructions, the US was becoming a pre-eminent provider of, and the US needed oil, a resource the Saudis had in abundance. This is a relationship that has endured a lot; but, it is also a relationship that has as it sole quality: strategic interests.
This being said, one of the assumptions that Unger’s argument relies on is the notion that this strategic relationship, though seemingly untenable now, has somehow always been unnecessary. Unger does this through example of the Bush family, or the House of Bush. The evidence Unger brings to bear with respect to Bush Sr. and his relationship with the House of Saud is tangential at best and unremarkable in the main.
After Bush sold his stake in Zapata, his oil company, he entered the realm of politics, a decision that had more to do with deference to his father than purely an ambitious power grab. What’s interesting is that Bush Sr. received more help from the Kuwaiti government at the time than from the House of Saud. It is true, however, that it wasn’t until Bush Sr. started rising in political visibility that financial suitors took notice, especially Saudi financial. Unger points out the canny nature of the Saudis’ goal of securing their political desires in this passage:
Like the Israelis, The Saudis had one overwhelming need that they sought in this new alliance—defense. For all its newfound wealth the House of Saud was more vulnerable militarily than ever… the Saudis sought strong political ties to the United States through personal friendships with the powers that be… To many Americans, the Saudi investments with politicians seemed unsavory, though it was not always precisely clear why. The most obvious assumption was that Saudis were trying to buy access to the White House or to influence policy toward Israel—or against it.
What appears at first as flagrant disregard for American interest turns out to simply be systemic. The Saudis or the House of Saud consistently “buy access” through bailing out and financially aiding associates of political prominent figures.
This apparently was the case with Jimmy Carter’s close ally Bert Lance, who upon resigning at OMB(Office of Management and Budget) was helped out financially through some questionable transactions from the BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International), a shadowy merchant bank founded by Agha Hasan Abedi, a Pakistani with close ties to the Saudi royals.
BCCI was alleged to have dealings in money laundering, the arms and drug trade. It’s a wonder that such a bank was freely operating in the US—let alone with reputable standing among Washington’s political class. It is no surprise that BCCI would also figure into the murky world of oil and politics in Saudi Arabia and America.
Unger, though it is conceded to begin with, fails to qualify one obvious counter-argument: That is, the relationship between the House of Saud and the House of Bush is more a function of American dependency on oil and Texas expertise in oil exploration particularly, as well as Saudi desire to position themselves with the political elite. These conditions created a perfect cocktail wherein the perception of growing political power, with the Bush family, only attracted the attention of the Saudis. And, in turn, once this loose relationship was formed, a nasty feed back loop created privilege, patronage, and patrimony.
Geography is destiny, and never were two institutions more congruent than this.
As this relationship pertains to foreign policy, again Unger misses the point—or at least doesn’t give all too convincing an argument. That the dynamics of international politics in the Middle East during the decade of the Soviet-Afghan war created the framework from which Islamic fundamentalist grew is not in doubt. But whether it was causally related to Bush Sr. relationship with the House of Saud is an entirely different contention. This does seem to be the implication in Unger’s tone, yet he arrives about it in a roundabout way.
A policy to roll back the Soviets from Afghanistan found its origins in the Carter Administration. Zbignew Brezenski, Carter’s National Security Advisor at the time, believed that supplying insurgent guerillas, notably the Eastern Alliance, with arms and intelligence would draw Soviet troops into Afghanistan, creating a war of attrition that would surely demoralize the Soviets. This policy was carried through to the fist Reagan-Bush Administration, although the intensity was ratcheted up. In order to finance this policy, Saudi Arabia became the intermediary, funneling cash and arms to the Islamist fighters eager to protect Muslim land.
The Afghan-Soviet war, subsequently, not only became an ideological and military proxy war that helped defeat Soviet communism, it also became a breeding ground for idealist young Muslims who disdained modernity. One of those young idealistic Muslims was Osama Bin Laden, however. As the United State poised its self to become the only legitimate super power in what was gradually looking like a unipolar world, the strategic exigencies of financing Islamists during the Afghan-Soviet war would turn out create a monster of their own making.
But, try as he might, Unger is unable to persuasively make the case that ex post facto that that strategic gamble wasn’t in the best security interest of the United States, at the time. Further, endemic in the foreign policy constraints of the US is there ability to project power to the extent to which it will not endanger there strategic interest, namely oil. Even as regards the first Gulf war, strategic interests shifted making Saddam Hussein a liability, when only 10 years prior he was an ally against Iran. It may be with equal proportion the extent to which Osama bin Laden abhors the Saudi Royals and the West, the United States specifically. But to say, even imply that in any way the House of Bush as a causal factor in creating the ferocity of Osama bin Laden is tortured logic. Post hoc, ergo Propter hoc is a fallacy often committed when looking for causal blame to assign.
A myriad of variables created the type of Terror practiced by Osama bin Laden. And the House of Saudi is, I think, largely to blame. The United States, as an entity, operates in such a way that its interests are always protected, much like any other state. The exception with the United States is that because of its unrivaled military strengths it can compel other weaker states to act against their interests, while, at the same time, fulfilling theirs. The relationship with the House of Bush and the House of Saud clearly looks sinister, though Unger gives the relationship too much credit.
Unger does, however, manage to produce a pithy and comprehensible account of the short history leading up to 9/11. With twists and turns, House of Bush, House of Saud raises far more questions than it answers. For example, why were140 Saudi Arabians allowed to fly out of the United States, without seriously being questioned, shortly after 9/11? Is James Baker a more nefarious character in this drama than either Bush Sr. or Bush Jr.? Was Osama bin laden really behind the downing of the Black Hawk in Somalia?
These are all interesting questions with which, I think, Unger should have dealt with more. But were Unger is to be commended is in his investigative breadth. He was able to cull together disparate governmental documents, old interviews, policy papers, financial disclosure forms and construct a cogent story about the pre-9/11 variables that helped bring about the post-9/11 world.
Unger attempts to forward a foreign policy critique but isn’t able to consider the constraints on policy makers. The main thrust of his book forwards the thesis that the relationship between the House of Bush and the House of Saud has in some way deliberately created the circumstances in which we find ourselves today. This is far too ambitious a thesis which neglects the real foreign policy imperatives and constraints.
Nonetheless, on balance, Unger’s book is absent of the type of partisanship that muddles honest critique.
Thursday, July 15, 2004
A Non Sequitur in American Foreign Policy
The SSCI and the UK’s own pre-war intelligence inquiry have forced many liberal supporters of the war and humanitarian hawks to re-asses their own assumptions about the Iraq War. I, myself, have been at odds to reconcile the findings in these reports with my own hawkish position on the War. It turns out that most, if not practically all, the intelligence used as justification for the war was either too ambiguous or entirely false.
With the common perception that Saddam Hussein was years and possibly months away from reconstituting his nuclear weapons program, the international community, at some level, understood the US’s urgency in quickly acting to deter Saddam. And, certainly, in a post-9/11 political climate the issue of American national security became paramount, thus prompting the revisiting of the Saddam problem.
Though, it appears that the real triumph of both the Blair and the Bush administration was to move so quickly the foreign policy precept of a containable and controllable Saddam and Iraq, to the perception, now proven false, of the imminent and gathering threat Saddam posed to not only the US, but to the world.
Conventional wisdom was jettisoned, as the Bush administration moved frantically to connect the dots: 9/11, Iraq, al Qaeda, Saddam, and Bin Laden.
The foreign policy establishment wasn’t convinced; but that didn’t matter. Congress had overwhelmingly passed an Iraq resolution that would allow the president to use the force necessary to make Saddam comply with UN res. 1441. One must recall that res. 1441 compelled Saddam to allow UN weapons inspectors into Iraq, giving them unfettered access to all suspected areas. This, however, was facilitated by the presences of over 180, 000 troops ominously surrounding the country; the visible threat of force.
But all these procedural formalities made no difference since the war games—strategy for the Iraq invasion—had taken place as soon as Rumsfeld stepped into the Pentagon, in January of 2001. So if the invasion of Iraq was a fait accompli long before all the political maneuverings at the UN, then why was it a fait accompli? One word: Neo-conservatism.
Many posit, rightly, that Neo-cons have been intent on reestablishing American global hegemony in the Middle East, and the best way to do this was to go for the weakest link: Saddam and Iraq. This meant that despite the economic absurdity, the political stupidity, and the diplomatic idiocy of such a venture so soon after Afghanistan, it still had to be undertaken for the simply fact of committing to the venture while the Republicans were still in power.
9/11 gave them the requisite wiggle room.
The Realist establishment of foreign policy maintained that the Iraq was a good seven to nine years away from a weapons program, manageable for the meantime without aggressive military commitment, considering the exigent priorities of Afghanistan and the War on terror. And while I too maintain, much like the Neo-cons that the regional stability of the Middle East depended on what happened with Saddam, the US needed to be realistic and judicious with its resources, which now seem to be compromised.
My contention is that the neo-cons thought so lowly of the Realist that they assumed no good faith effort would have ever been made in the future( by a Democratic administration) to address the Saddam issue. That will never be known, but, to some extent, I share their misgivings. Realizing that their only possibility to broach, let alone implement, the Iraq venture, the neo-cons pushed the talks of the Iraq war harder and faster, it was a window soon closing .
And now, even when US political and diplomatic capital has been greatly squandered, the plan, in the Neo-cons eyes, is under way, whether or not this current Administration survives to see the second phase.
The US felt Iraq wasn’t adequately complying with res.1441 because no weapons or evidence of a weapons program were being found—likely because none actually existed—so they gave Saddam 48 hours to step down or else. In fact, it didn’t matter that the inspections weren’t turning anything up, because the war plan scheduled combat for early March. 180, 000 troops weren’t there to simply make Saddam comply, and the longer the inspectors were inspecting, the further off schedule the war was being delayed.
From purely a management perceptive, the Iraq war was a magnificent blunder in US foreign policy, quite possibly rivaling Vietnam. There are no short term benefits both politically and diplomatically, and the long term benefits will follow after only years and possibly decades of regional instability. Though, such a scenario would have also been likely had the US waited another 5 years. Since, it seems improbable that more support would have been given the coalition, especially considering the growing Muslim demographic in Germany and France, and perpetual Russian obstinacy.
Thus, even if the US were unable to get the type of coalition it needed for a future invasion of Iraq, both materially and rhetorically, they undoubtedly would have been in a firmer position strategically if Afghanistan and the tribal area on the Pakistani border were more stable than they are currently. So the argument that the Iraq war diverted necessary resources from Afghanistan and has accomplished very little strategically becomes even stronger when you consider how tight militarily the situation is in Iraq. 135, 000 US troops will be in Iraq for a minimum of 3 years. After that, the situation is unknown. In an ideal world the Bush administration would have waited to invade Iraq; similarly, the following administration, it is hoped, would also take seriously not simply the threat of Saddam, but its inherent responsibility to remove Saddam. Therefore, the invasion of Iraq begins to look like a non sequiter in US foreign policy, accomplishing nothing else but starting something that should have been done years prior, and committing to something that has proven to be wholly unmanageable now.
But let’s not fool ourselves into thinking that the Bush administration didn’t pressure the Intelligence community, since it wasn’t their decision that Iraq be invaded. Despite evidence to the contrary, the Bush administration let it be known that Iraq and Saddam was a priority. By conceding that intelligence was faulty, and distancing its self from the CIA, the administration realizes that no rationale justified this war—at least one that would have warranted such hasty action. So again, the war, from any stretch of reality, didn’t and doesn’t make any sense (hopefully, for the US’s sake, it does in the future) and for that reason alone Bush shouldn’t be re-elected.
With the common perception that Saddam Hussein was years and possibly months away from reconstituting his nuclear weapons program, the international community, at some level, understood the US’s urgency in quickly acting to deter Saddam. And, certainly, in a post-9/11 political climate the issue of American national security became paramount, thus prompting the revisiting of the Saddam problem.
Though, it appears that the real triumph of both the Blair and the Bush administration was to move so quickly the foreign policy precept of a containable and controllable Saddam and Iraq, to the perception, now proven false, of the imminent and gathering threat Saddam posed to not only the US, but to the world.
Conventional wisdom was jettisoned, as the Bush administration moved frantically to connect the dots: 9/11, Iraq, al Qaeda, Saddam, and Bin Laden.
The foreign policy establishment wasn’t convinced; but that didn’t matter. Congress had overwhelmingly passed an Iraq resolution that would allow the president to use the force necessary to make Saddam comply with UN res. 1441. One must recall that res. 1441 compelled Saddam to allow UN weapons inspectors into Iraq, giving them unfettered access to all suspected areas. This, however, was facilitated by the presences of over 180, 000 troops ominously surrounding the country; the visible threat of force.
But all these procedural formalities made no difference since the war games—strategy for the Iraq invasion—had taken place as soon as Rumsfeld stepped into the Pentagon, in January of 2001. So if the invasion of Iraq was a fait accompli long before all the political maneuverings at the UN, then why was it a fait accompli? One word: Neo-conservatism.
Many posit, rightly, that Neo-cons have been intent on reestablishing American global hegemony in the Middle East, and the best way to do this was to go for the weakest link: Saddam and Iraq. This meant that despite the economic absurdity, the political stupidity, and the diplomatic idiocy of such a venture so soon after Afghanistan, it still had to be undertaken for the simply fact of committing to the venture while the Republicans were still in power.
9/11 gave them the requisite wiggle room.
The Realist establishment of foreign policy maintained that the Iraq was a good seven to nine years away from a weapons program, manageable for the meantime without aggressive military commitment, considering the exigent priorities of Afghanistan and the War on terror. And while I too maintain, much like the Neo-cons that the regional stability of the Middle East depended on what happened with Saddam, the US needed to be realistic and judicious with its resources, which now seem to be compromised.
My contention is that the neo-cons thought so lowly of the Realist that they assumed no good faith effort would have ever been made in the future( by a Democratic administration) to address the Saddam issue. That will never be known, but, to some extent, I share their misgivings. Realizing that their only possibility to broach, let alone implement, the Iraq venture, the neo-cons pushed the talks of the Iraq war harder and faster, it was a window soon closing .
And now, even when US political and diplomatic capital has been greatly squandered, the plan, in the Neo-cons eyes, is under way, whether or not this current Administration survives to see the second phase.
The US felt Iraq wasn’t adequately complying with res.1441 because no weapons or evidence of a weapons program were being found—likely because none actually existed—so they gave Saddam 48 hours to step down or else. In fact, it didn’t matter that the inspections weren’t turning anything up, because the war plan scheduled combat for early March. 180, 000 troops weren’t there to simply make Saddam comply, and the longer the inspectors were inspecting, the further off schedule the war was being delayed.
From purely a management perceptive, the Iraq war was a magnificent blunder in US foreign policy, quite possibly rivaling Vietnam. There are no short term benefits both politically and diplomatically, and the long term benefits will follow after only years and possibly decades of regional instability. Though, such a scenario would have also been likely had the US waited another 5 years. Since, it seems improbable that more support would have been given the coalition, especially considering the growing Muslim demographic in Germany and France, and perpetual Russian obstinacy.
Thus, even if the US were unable to get the type of coalition it needed for a future invasion of Iraq, both materially and rhetorically, they undoubtedly would have been in a firmer position strategically if Afghanistan and the tribal area on the Pakistani border were more stable than they are currently. So the argument that the Iraq war diverted necessary resources from Afghanistan and has accomplished very little strategically becomes even stronger when you consider how tight militarily the situation is in Iraq. 135, 000 US troops will be in Iraq for a minimum of 3 years. After that, the situation is unknown. In an ideal world the Bush administration would have waited to invade Iraq; similarly, the following administration, it is hoped, would also take seriously not simply the threat of Saddam, but its inherent responsibility to remove Saddam. Therefore, the invasion of Iraq begins to look like a non sequiter in US foreign policy, accomplishing nothing else but starting something that should have been done years prior, and committing to something that has proven to be wholly unmanageable now.
But let’s not fool ourselves into thinking that the Bush administration didn’t pressure the Intelligence community, since it wasn’t their decision that Iraq be invaded. Despite evidence to the contrary, the Bush administration let it be known that Iraq and Saddam was a priority. By conceding that intelligence was faulty, and distancing its self from the CIA, the administration realizes that no rationale justified this war—at least one that would have warranted such hasty action. So again, the war, from any stretch of reality, didn’t and doesn’t make any sense (hopefully, for the US’s sake, it does in the future) and for that reason alone Bush shouldn’t be re-elected.
Saturday, July 10, 2004
The Apostate
Dennis Miller has come a long way since his days at SNL. Today it wouldn’t be incorrect to say that he’s come full circle—or, for that matter, done the impossible by circling the square. Now Miller runs with a group of unappreciated, at least in their field, derided, and much scorned individuals: The Conservative Entertainers. Besides Miller, I’m unaware of any other comedian as conservative as him(Rickles notwithstanding). It is, to be sure, a truism that Hollywood Entertainers are congenitally liberal. But comedians tend to be equal opportunity satirist, attacking any and all public figures. In this, Miller wasn’t an exception.
Though after 9/11, and understandably so, Miller has purveyed a slightly edgier brand of humor, bordering, some have said, on crypto-racist. And when it seemed like satirists were again allowed to aim at politics, in general, and the Bush Administration, specifically, Miller didn’t follow suit. In fact, Miller was swept into the Administration’s gravitational force. On numerous occasions he was invited to meet the President and Vice President, offering his comedic thoughts on post 9/11 responsibilities—full throated and uncritical support of the Bush Administration.
The verve in his humor began to wilt under the sheer weight of gravity; he was in the Administration’s orbit.
Miller has always unabashedly cut through turgid, dim political rhetoric with a dour remark and smirk. Everyone was a target. Not out of disrespect, but because of respect, and some ironic sense of equal opportunity sarcasm. And, mostly, out of self-interest: first comic principle, go for the best laugh. With a wealth of comic material available today, Miller’s filter is too partisan and greatly limits his natural comic talent. That is not say that Miller’s liberal bashing isn’t sharp. It’s good; great even. But his Conservative bashing was even more brilliant. Miller doesn’t make the effort he’s usually know for making.
To be fair, The Daily Show tends towards liberal comedy, bashing Conservatives. But nowhere else will you find more irreverent liberal bashing, too.
The height of this self-restraint that Miller was begrudged to express, was during his very first show on CNBC were he proclaimed, astonishingly, that he wouldn’t criticize the President, at all. Not only has he kept dutifully to his word, he’s gone even further and towed the GOP party line. Forget about not criticizing Bush, he’s down right sentimental any time Bush’s name is uttered. Opportunities to clinically skewer any Conservative political figure, as a matter of form, of course, are constantly squandered. Still, though, Miller is tough not to enjoy when he lathers up a smooth patina of obscure political references and waxes the only way he can, and always has, linguistically flawless.
Yet Miller seems to be trapped inside an orbit he can’t escape. He also telegraphically conveys a muted self-imposition he’s applied to any dormant, seditious thoughts. You know he can’t believe what he’s saying. An almost strange wonderment crosses his face when he speaks the party line, as though the obvious punch-line, so closely standing on his tongue, is dragged back into this new self-censoring gravitational pull, somewhere between the pit of his stomach, what used to be his guts, down through his large intestine, all the way through his small intestine, down to where is ball used to reside.
To the extent that John Ashcroft is loathed by Democrats and Liberals alike, it should be fairly said of him that he is what he is. You know what you get with Ashcroft, and, at some level, he’s a Culture Warrior who has let it be known where he stands and for that some respect is deserved. Though, Miller appears to be captivated by the aura and power of the presidency, unable to think critically his way out of this golden cage. It’s difficult to know where he stands; but, if there is any sure indicator, it’s his eyes. They betray him every time.
Though after 9/11, and understandably so, Miller has purveyed a slightly edgier brand of humor, bordering, some have said, on crypto-racist. And when it seemed like satirists were again allowed to aim at politics, in general, and the Bush Administration, specifically, Miller didn’t follow suit. In fact, Miller was swept into the Administration’s gravitational force. On numerous occasions he was invited to meet the President and Vice President, offering his comedic thoughts on post 9/11 responsibilities—full throated and uncritical support of the Bush Administration.
The verve in his humor began to wilt under the sheer weight of gravity; he was in the Administration’s orbit.
Miller has always unabashedly cut through turgid, dim political rhetoric with a dour remark and smirk. Everyone was a target. Not out of disrespect, but because of respect, and some ironic sense of equal opportunity sarcasm. And, mostly, out of self-interest: first comic principle, go for the best laugh. With a wealth of comic material available today, Miller’s filter is too partisan and greatly limits his natural comic talent. That is not say that Miller’s liberal bashing isn’t sharp. It’s good; great even. But his Conservative bashing was even more brilliant. Miller doesn’t make the effort he’s usually know for making.
To be fair, The Daily Show tends towards liberal comedy, bashing Conservatives. But nowhere else will you find more irreverent liberal bashing, too.
The height of this self-restraint that Miller was begrudged to express, was during his very first show on CNBC were he proclaimed, astonishingly, that he wouldn’t criticize the President, at all. Not only has he kept dutifully to his word, he’s gone even further and towed the GOP party line. Forget about not criticizing Bush, he’s down right sentimental any time Bush’s name is uttered. Opportunities to clinically skewer any Conservative political figure, as a matter of form, of course, are constantly squandered. Still, though, Miller is tough not to enjoy when he lathers up a smooth patina of obscure political references and waxes the only way he can, and always has, linguistically flawless.
Yet Miller seems to be trapped inside an orbit he can’t escape. He also telegraphically conveys a muted self-imposition he’s applied to any dormant, seditious thoughts. You know he can’t believe what he’s saying. An almost strange wonderment crosses his face when he speaks the party line, as though the obvious punch-line, so closely standing on his tongue, is dragged back into this new self-censoring gravitational pull, somewhere between the pit of his stomach, what used to be his guts, down through his large intestine, all the way through his small intestine, down to where is ball used to reside.
To the extent that John Ashcroft is loathed by Democrats and Liberals alike, it should be fairly said of him that he is what he is. You know what you get with Ashcroft, and, at some level, he’s a Culture Warrior who has let it be known where he stands and for that some respect is deserved. Though, Miller appears to be captivated by the aura and power of the presidency, unable to think critically his way out of this golden cage. It’s difficult to know where he stands; but, if there is any sure indicator, it’s his eyes. They betray him every time.
Thursday, July 08, 2004
Why George W. Bush will win the election.....
If nothing else, it appears that the War on Terror will win the election for Bush this November. You ever wonder why bin Laden hadn’t been captured up until now?—so has everyone else in the free world. And what of the claim about playing politics with national security—don’t be your f**kin’ life on it. Bush doesn’t f**k around, and this is why... My apologizes for the expletives; this is what it’s come to.
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