Thursday, July 29, 2004

House of Bush, House of Saud

Politics rarely has a dearth of partisanship. Even when times are good and there seems to be no unifying focus for political parties, partisanship becomes gratuitous. The booming 90’s of the Clinton administration strongly attest to that fact. Whitewater, Travel-gate, and, more prominently, the Monica Lewinsky imbroglio, among others, are illustrative of the length to which excessive partisanship impedes sound, sober analysis. Moreover, these partisan excursions, some with merit, though a great many without, show how incredibly dangerous a lack of political focus can affect a country. While a vapid pantomime played its self out on the world stage during the late 90’s, sulking in the backdrop, and dutifully rehearsing act II, was Osama bin Laden and his foot soldiers of Jihad. After introducing himself and his cadre of Islamist fundamentalist to the world on September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden has managed to change the rules of the game, thus shaking the operating dynamics of the West. Yet partisanship still persists in both its good and deleterious forms.

On the other side of the aisles, now, are the Democrats. In an almost Renaissance—though clearly in a vulgar sense—the Democratic/Liberal intelligentsia is engaging itself in debate, sometimes civil, yet most often heated, about the relevance and principles of the Progressive movement and, subsequently, the direction of the Country. Similar to the Conservatives who found themselves bereft of the executive for two Clinton Administrations--however much worse because both houses of Congress are in GOP control-- Liberals, Progressive, and Democrats alike have too much time on their hands to either chase after conspiratorial and blatantly partisan stories or formulate, articulate, and propagate a vision of where they think the country should be headed. The acuity of these variables has only been intensified as the presidential election approaches.

Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right, Big Lies: The Right-Wing Propaganda Machine and How it Distorts the Truth, and Bushwhacked: Life in George W. Bush’s America are just a few of the titles you’ll see gracing shelves at your local bookstore. Political discourse, especially criticism of the Bush administration, has been busting at the seams with deleterious partisanship. Where this critique has discredited itself by imitating all that it criticizes, it has also, on rare occasions, moved beyond the tired paradigm and offered intelligent, evocative dissent. One such critique is Craig Unger’s House of Bush, House of Saud.

Craig Unger, former deputy editor of the New York Observer, is an investigative journalist who has written on the Bushes before. House of Bush, House of Saud meticulously delves into the mostly ambiguous financial dealings between the Bush family, George H. W. and George W, and their associates, former Secretary of State James Baker, Vice President Dick Cheney and a slew of others, and the House of Saud, the Saudi Royal Family and their associates, the Saudi business elite and, ominously, the bin Laden family. Unger’s aim is to put flesh to the skeletal of the whole sordid and mysterious relationship, attempting to show, at the same time, that this relationship has “… helped trigger the Age of Terror and give rise to the tragedy of 9/11.”

Unger’s book is excellently sourced and vividly smooth in its prose, following a well constructed timeline of the evolution of this relationship and presidential politics and foreign policy in the US. As a muscular journalistic polemic the book has its moments. But, on measure, the argument Unger posits rests on too many, though probable, unwarranted assumptions.


Thus, although House of Bush, House of Saud is a gripping and suspenseful narrative that deals, chronologically with the convoluted financial relationship between the House of Bush and the House of Saud and its effect on US foreign policy in general and US-Saudi relations specifically, it fail where it intends to succeed, and unintentionally succeed where it shouldn’t. I will expand on this further by, first, looking at the some of the inferences that Unger draws from his admittedly shaky assumptions, and, second, by noting areas that Unger could have explored at greater length.

On Valentine’s Day in 1945, the president of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia to set in motion what would be a long standing mutual relationship between the two countries. The Saudis needed security, which, in the aftermath of World War two reconstructions, the US was becoming a pre-eminent provider of, and the US needed oil, a resource the Saudis had in abundance. This is a relationship that has endured a lot; but, it is also a relationship that has as it sole quality: strategic interests.

This being said, one of the assumptions that Unger’s argument relies on is the notion that this strategic relationship, though seemingly untenable now, has somehow always been unnecessary. Unger does this through example of the Bush family, or the House of Bush. The evidence Unger brings to bear with respect to Bush Sr. and his relationship with the House of Saud is tangential at best and unremarkable in the main.

After Bush sold his stake in Zapata, his oil company, he entered the realm of politics, a decision that had more to do with deference to his father than purely an ambitious power grab. What’s interesting is that Bush Sr. received more help from the Kuwaiti government at the time than from the House of Saud. It is true, however, that it wasn’t until Bush Sr. started rising in political visibility that financial suitors took notice, especially Saudi financial. Unger points out the canny nature of the Saudis’ goal of securing their political desires in this passage:

Like the Israelis, The Saudis had one overwhelming need that they sought in this new alliance—defense. For all its newfound wealth the House of Saud was more vulnerable militarily than ever… the Saudis sought strong political ties to the United States through personal friendships with the powers that be… To many Americans, the Saudi investments with politicians seemed unsavory, though it was not always precisely clear why. The most obvious assumption was that Saudis were trying to buy access to the White House or to influence policy toward Israel—or against it.

What appears at first as flagrant disregard for American interest turns out to simply be systemic. The Saudis or the House of Saud consistently “buy access” through bailing out and financially aiding associates of political prominent figures.

This apparently was the case with Jimmy Carter’s close ally Bert Lance, who upon resigning at OMB(Office of Management and Budget) was helped out financially through some questionable transactions from the BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International), a shadowy merchant bank founded by Agha Hasan Abedi, a Pakistani with close ties to the Saudi royals.

BCCI was alleged to have dealings in money laundering, the arms and drug trade. It’s a wonder that such a bank was freely operating in the US—let alone with reputable standing among Washington’s political class. It is no surprise that BCCI would also figure into the murky world of oil and politics in Saudi Arabia and America.

Unger, though it is conceded to begin with, fails to qualify one obvious counter-argument: That is, the relationship between the House of Saud and the House of Bush is more a function of American dependency on oil and Texas expertise in oil exploration particularly, as well as Saudi desire to position themselves with the political elite. These conditions created a perfect cocktail wherein the perception of growing political power, with the Bush family, only attracted the attention of the Saudis. And, in turn, once this loose relationship was formed, a nasty feed back loop created privilege, patronage, and patrimony.

Geography is destiny, and never were two institutions more congruent than this.

As this relationship pertains to foreign policy, again Unger misses the point—or at least doesn’t give all too convincing an argument. That the dynamics of international politics in the Middle East during the decade of the Soviet-Afghan war created the framework from which Islamic fundamentalist grew is not in doubt. But whether it was causally related to Bush Sr. relationship with the House of Saud is an entirely different contention. This does seem to be the implication in Unger’s tone, yet he arrives about it in a roundabout way.

A policy to roll back the Soviets from Afghanistan found its origins in the Carter Administration. Zbignew Brezenski, Carter’s National Security Advisor at the time, believed that supplying insurgent guerillas, notably the Eastern Alliance, with arms and intelligence would draw Soviet troops into Afghanistan, creating a war of attrition that would surely demoralize the Soviets. This policy was carried through to the fist Reagan-Bush Administration, although the intensity was ratcheted up. In order to finance this policy, Saudi Arabia became the intermediary, funneling cash and arms to the Islamist fighters eager to protect Muslim land.

The Afghan-Soviet war, subsequently, not only became an ideological and military proxy war that helped defeat Soviet communism, it also became a breeding ground for idealist young Muslims who disdained modernity. One of those young idealistic Muslims was Osama Bin Laden, however. As the United State poised its self to become the only legitimate super power in what was gradually looking like a unipolar world, the strategic exigencies of financing Islamists during the Afghan-Soviet war would turn out create a monster of their own making.

But, try as he might, Unger is unable to persuasively make the case that ex post facto that that strategic gamble wasn’t in the best security interest of the United States, at the time. Further, endemic in the foreign policy constraints of the US is there ability to project power to the extent to which it will not endanger there strategic interest, namely oil. Even as regards the first Gulf war, strategic interests shifted making Saddam Hussein a liability, when only 10 years prior he was an ally against Iran. It may be with equal proportion the extent to which Osama bin Laden abhors the Saudi Royals and the West, the United States specifically. But to say, even imply that in any way the House of Bush as a causal factor in creating the ferocity of Osama bin Laden is tortured logic. Post hoc, ergo Propter hoc is a fallacy often committed when looking for causal blame to assign.

A myriad of variables created the type of Terror practiced by Osama bin Laden. And the House of Saudi is, I think, largely to blame. The United States, as an entity, operates in such a way that its interests are always protected, much like any other state. The exception with the United States is that because of its unrivaled military strengths it can compel other weaker states to act against their interests, while, at the same time, fulfilling theirs. The relationship with the House of Bush and the House of Saud clearly looks sinister, though Unger gives the relationship too much credit.

Unger does, however, manage to produce a pithy and comprehensible account of the short history leading up to 9/11. With twists and turns, House of Bush, House of Saud raises far more questions than it answers. For example, why were140 Saudi Arabians allowed to fly out of the United States, without seriously being questioned, shortly after 9/11? Is James Baker a more nefarious character in this drama than either Bush Sr. or Bush Jr.? Was Osama bin laden really behind the downing of the Black Hawk in Somalia?

These are all interesting questions with which, I think, Unger should have dealt with more. But were Unger is to be commended is in his investigative breadth. He was able to cull together disparate governmental documents, old interviews, policy papers, financial disclosure forms and construct a cogent story about the pre-9/11 variables that helped bring about the post-9/11 world.

Unger attempts to forward a foreign policy critique but isn’t able to consider the constraints on policy makers. The main thrust of his book forwards the thesis that the relationship between the House of Bush and the House of Saud has in some way deliberately created the circumstances in which we find ourselves today. This is far too ambitious a thesis which neglects the real foreign policy imperatives and constraints.

Nonetheless, on balance, Unger’s book is absent of the type of partisanship that muddles honest critique.

Thursday, July 15, 2004

A Non Sequitur in American Foreign Policy

The SSCI and the UK’s own pre-war intelligence inquiry have forced many liberal supporters of the war and humanitarian hawks to re-asses their own assumptions about the Iraq War. I, myself, have been at odds to reconcile the findings in these reports with my own hawkish position on the War. It turns out that most, if not practically all, the intelligence used as justification for the war was either too ambiguous or entirely false.

With the common perception that Saddam Hussein was years and possibly months away from reconstituting his nuclear weapons program, the international community, at some level, understood the US’s urgency in quickly acting to deter Saddam. And, certainly, in a post-9/11 political climate the issue of American national security became paramount, thus prompting the revisiting of the Saddam problem.

Though, it appears that the real triumph of both the Blair and the Bush administration was to move so quickly the foreign policy precept of a containable and controllable Saddam and Iraq, to the perception, now proven false, of the imminent and gathering threat Saddam posed to not only the US, but to the world.

Conventional wisdom was jettisoned, as the Bush administration moved frantically to connect the dots: 9/11, Iraq, al Qaeda, Saddam, and Bin Laden.

The foreign policy establishment wasn’t convinced; but that didn’t matter. Congress had overwhelmingly passed an Iraq resolution that would allow the president to use the force necessary to make Saddam comply with UN res. 1441. One must recall that res. 1441 compelled Saddam to allow UN weapons inspectors into Iraq, giving them unfettered access to all suspected areas. This, however, was facilitated by the presences of over 180, 000 troops ominously surrounding the country; the visible threat of force.

But all these procedural formalities made no difference since the war games—strategy for the Iraq invasion—had taken place as soon as Rumsfeld stepped into the Pentagon, in January of 2001. So if the invasion of Iraq was a fait accompli long before all the political maneuverings at the UN, then why was it a fait accompli? One word: Neo-conservatism.

Many posit, rightly, that Neo-cons have been intent on reestablishing American global hegemony in the Middle East, and the best way to do this was to go for the weakest link: Saddam and Iraq. This meant that despite the economic absurdity, the political stupidity, and the diplomatic idiocy of such a venture so soon after Afghanistan, it still had to be undertaken for the simply fact of committing to the venture while the Republicans were still in power.

9/11 gave them the requisite wiggle room.

The Realist establishment of foreign policy maintained that the Iraq was a good seven to nine years away from a weapons program, manageable for the meantime without aggressive military commitment, considering the exigent priorities of Afghanistan and the War on terror. And while I too maintain, much like the Neo-cons that the regional stability of the Middle East depended on what happened with Saddam, the US needed to be realistic and judicious with its resources, which now seem to be compromised.

My contention is that the neo-cons thought so lowly of the Realist that they assumed no good faith effort would have ever been made in the future( by a Democratic administration) to address the Saddam issue. That will never be known, but, to some extent, I share their misgivings. Realizing that their only possibility to broach, let alone implement, the Iraq venture, the neo-cons pushed the talks of the Iraq war harder and faster, it was a window soon closing .

And now, even when US political and diplomatic capital has been greatly squandered, the plan, in the Neo-cons eyes, is under way, whether or not this current Administration survives to see the second phase.

The US felt Iraq wasn’t adequately complying with res.1441 because no weapons or evidence of a weapons program were being found—likely because none actually existed—so they gave Saddam 48 hours to step down or else. In fact, it didn’t matter that the inspections weren’t turning anything up, because the war plan scheduled combat for early March. 180, 000 troops weren’t there to simply make Saddam comply, and the longer the inspectors were inspecting, the further off schedule the war was being delayed.

From purely a management perceptive, the Iraq war was a magnificent blunder in US foreign policy, quite possibly rivaling Vietnam. There are no short term benefits both politically and diplomatically, and the long term benefits will follow after only years and possibly decades of regional instability. Though, such a scenario would have also been likely had the US waited another 5 years. Since, it seems improbable that more support would have been given the coalition, especially considering the growing Muslim demographic in Germany and France, and perpetual Russian obstinacy.

Thus, even if the US were unable to get the type of coalition it needed for a future invasion of Iraq, both materially and rhetorically, they undoubtedly would have been in a firmer position strategically if Afghanistan and the tribal area on the Pakistani border were more stable than they are currently. So the argument that the Iraq war diverted necessary resources from Afghanistan and has accomplished very little strategically becomes even stronger when you consider how tight militarily the situation is in Iraq. 135, 000 US troops will be in Iraq for a minimum of 3 years. After that, the situation is unknown. In an ideal world the Bush administration would have waited to invade Iraq; similarly, the following administration, it is hoped, would also take seriously not simply the threat of Saddam, but its inherent responsibility to remove Saddam. Therefore, the invasion of Iraq begins to look like a non sequiter in US foreign policy, accomplishing nothing else but starting something that should have been done years prior, and committing to something that has proven to be wholly unmanageable now.

But let’s not fool ourselves into thinking that the Bush administration didn’t pressure the Intelligence community, since it wasn’t their decision that Iraq be invaded. Despite evidence to the contrary, the Bush administration let it be known that Iraq and Saddam was a priority. By conceding that intelligence was faulty, and distancing its self from the CIA, the administration realizes that no rationale justified this war—at least one that would have warranted such hasty action. So again, the war, from any stretch of reality, didn’t and doesn’t make any sense (hopefully, for the US’s sake, it does in the future) and for that reason alone Bush shouldn’t be re-elected.

Saturday, July 10, 2004

The Apostate

Dennis Miller has come a long way since his days at SNL. Today it wouldn’t be incorrect to say that he’s come full circle—or, for that matter, done the impossible by circling the square. Now Miller runs with a group of unappreciated, at least in their field, derided, and much scorned individuals: The Conservative Entertainers. Besides Miller, I’m unaware of any other comedian as conservative as him(Rickles notwithstanding). It is, to be sure, a truism that Hollywood Entertainers are congenitally liberal. But comedians tend to be equal opportunity satirist, attacking any and all public figures. In this, Miller wasn’t an exception.

Though after 9/11, and understandably so, Miller has purveyed a slightly edgier brand of humor, bordering, some have said, on crypto-racist. And when it seemed like satirists were again allowed to aim at politics, in general, and the Bush Administration, specifically, Miller didn’t follow suit. In fact, Miller was swept into the Administration’s gravitational force. On numerous occasions he was invited to meet the President and Vice President, offering his comedic thoughts on post 9/11 responsibilities—full throated and uncritical support of the Bush Administration.

The verve in his humor began to wilt under the sheer weight of gravity; he was in the Administration’s orbit.

Miller has always unabashedly cut through turgid, dim political rhetoric with a dour remark and smirk. Everyone was a target. Not out of disrespect, but because of respect, and some ironic sense of equal opportunity sarcasm. And, mostly, out of self-interest: first comic principle, go for the best laugh. With a wealth of comic material available today, Miller’s filter is too partisan and greatly limits his natural comic talent. That is not say that Miller’s liberal bashing isn’t sharp. It’s good; great even. But his Conservative bashing was even more brilliant. Miller doesn’t make the effort he’s usually know for making.

To be fair, The Daily Show tends towards liberal comedy, bashing Conservatives. But nowhere else will you find more irreverent liberal bashing, too.

The height of this self-restraint that Miller was begrudged to express, was during his very first show on CNBC were he proclaimed, astonishingly, that he wouldn’t criticize the President, at all. Not only has he kept dutifully to his word, he’s gone even further and towed the GOP party line. Forget about not criticizing Bush, he’s down right sentimental any time Bush’s name is uttered. Opportunities to clinically skewer any Conservative political figure, as a matter of form, of course, are constantly squandered. Still, though, Miller is tough not to enjoy when he lathers up a smooth patina of obscure political references and waxes the only way he can, and always has, linguistically flawless.

Yet Miller seems to be trapped inside an orbit he can’t escape. He also telegraphically conveys a muted self-imposition he’s applied to any dormant, seditious thoughts. You know he can’t believe what he’s saying. An almost strange wonderment crosses his face when he speaks the party line, as though the obvious punch-line, so closely standing on his tongue, is dragged back into this new self-censoring gravitational pull, somewhere between the pit of his stomach, what used to be his guts, down through his large intestine, all the way through his small intestine, down to where is ball used to reside.

To the extent that John Ashcroft is loathed by Democrats and Liberals alike, it should be fairly said of him that he is what he is. You know what you get with Ashcroft, and, at some level, he’s a Culture Warrior who has let it be known where he stands and for that some respect is deserved. Though, Miller appears to be captivated by the aura and power of the presidency, unable to think critically his way out of this golden cage. It’s difficult to know where he stands; but, if there is any sure indicator, it’s his eyes. They betray him every time.

Thursday, July 08, 2004

Why George W. Bush will win the election.....

If nothing else, it appears that the War on Terror will win the election for Bush this November. You ever wonder why bin Laden hadn’t been captured up until now?—so has everyone else in the free world. And what of the claim about playing politics with national security—don’t be your f**kin’ life on it. Bush doesn’t f**k around, and this is why... My apologizes for the expletives; this is what it’s come to.

Wednesday, June 23, 2004

Ennui

Political fatigue has set in during these last few days of the Federal campaign. Questions abound: Is Ralph Klein going to violate the Canada Health Act? Will Martin stop being so equivocal and take a position? In an effort to expand NDP influence in a likely minority government, will Jack Layton shave off that ridiculous moustache? Does Gilles Duceppe own a tie? Will the impassive and telegraphically mechanical Stephen Harper cut a deal to govern? What does Ralph Klein have to do with this line of questioning?

I guess it has much do to with Mr. Klein, the intoxicating Premier of Alberta, proffering his desire to revisit quasi-private funding for health care in his province. Such a proposal, which was to be unveiled two days after the election but was pushed up for today to avoid controversy, would have, in Mr. Klein’s own words, “contravene[d]" the Canada Health Act. Today, however, the language of the proposal was muted and revised, since it made no mention of Alberta’s intention to “contravene" the Canada Health Act. This will probably have no effect on the outcome of the election; but it released Stephen Harper from the scepter of possibly colluding with his Albertan brethren, Mr. Klein, to destroy health care.

What has been of some interest, though, is how effective the Liberal attack ads have been in driving down Mr. Harper’s favorables. The SES/CPAC poll has tracked a precipitous fluctuation in Canadians' choice for Prime Minister.

At the start of the election Mr. Martin enjoyed a 14 point lead, as 31% of Canadians (from the poll sampling) thought he’d be the best choice for Prime Minister—of the possible candidates. Yet as the campaign wore on and Ontario was hit with regressive tax hikes, in the form of an Ontario Health Premium—by a provincial government that just happens to be Liberal—Ontario voters weren’t happy. Election are won or lost in Ontario.

Needless to say, Mr. Martin’s favorables started reclining as Mr. Harper’s started picking up. Although, it seems, now, that sometime after the English language debate—or possibly the French Language debate—and after a series of gaffes on child porn, bilingualism, and health care, Harper’s favorables have been in a steady recline; oh, and yes, the negative ads by the Liberals which evoke in the minds of undecided voters the previous fiscal disasters of Conservative governments, helmed by Canadian conservative demigods Brian Mulroney and Mike Harris, also hurt Harper.

Harper’s favorable were up around 27% when Martin’s declined to 26%, but now Harper’s are down to 20% and Martin is right around 29%. Unsure is polling well at 25%--I should have legally changed my name to unsure and ran. So it looks like the bottom has fallen out of the Conservative campaign, which until last week was running virtually flawless.

Political junkies, like me, still persist in analyzing all the ephemera flying out of the campaign war rooms. Sane, reasonable people, instead, have already decided--that is, decided to stop watching the frivolous minutiae of the last days of this campaign.

As a phalanx of the punditry, the politicos, and the media breathlessly anticipate what will most certainly be an anti-climatic election finish, the electorate is dutifully ignoring the news and busy preparing for the Canada day long weekend. There is an old Chinese proverb that invokes today’s state of affairs: The dog barks but the caravan goes on. Or this one I especially like: The moon would not shine if it paid attention to all the dogs that barked at it—people will pay attention when it matters: on June 28th.

Monday, June 21, 2004

Reconstruct This

All too often people aren’t able to hear the good news coming out of Iraq. Sensationalism first, substance later is the operating mantra of News organization anxious to scoop the hottest story. From suicide bombings, attacks on coalition forces, and the continual sectarian, political posturing between the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA); the soon to be dissolved Iraqi Governing Council (IGC); and the just newly appointed Iraq Interim Government (IIG), the reconstruction of Iraq has hardly received the substantive coverage it's due. Nearly $20 billion in American taxpayer dollars are being spent on the reconstruction and the public accounting of these monies isn’t being thoroughly investigated. We know enough about the security situation in Iraq—which appears to be destabilizing, somewhat, before the June 30th handover, after weeks of relative stasis due in most part to the cease-fire reached with Moqtada sadr.

But do we know enough about the concrete differences the reconstruction has brought to the Iraqi people?

The sheer breadth of the details of reconstruction makes the topic less amendable to distilled news segment form. Even so, only in print, and rarely, will one find the type of coverage that accounts of the reconstruction. This has much to do with the investigative encumbrances of researching in Iraq with its poor security. Therefore, as the security goes in Iraq, so does the reconstruction.

Two lengthy articles, one in The Washington Post, the other in The Chicago Tribune, speak to the efforts being made during the tumultuous reconstruction of Iraq. Rajiv Chandrasekaran of The Washington Post interviewed various senior members of the CPA, the civilian authority tasked by the White house to administer the transition process. Of major concern is the ability of the CPA to disburse the funds necessary to reconstruct crucial infrastructure. This is being impeded by the continuous security threats:

About 15,000 Iraqis have been hired to work on projects funded by $18.6 billion in U.S. aid, despite promises to use the money to employ at least 250,000 Iraqis by this month. At of the beginning of June, 80 percent of the aid package, approved by Congress last fall, remained unspent.
[....]
Although the $18.6 billion reconstruction aid package was approved by Congress in November, the Pentagon office charged with spending it has moved slowly. About $3.7 billion of this package had been spent by June 1, according to the CPA. Many projects that have received funding have slowed or stopped entirely because Western firms have withdrawn employees from Iraq in response to attacks on civilian contractors.

CPA officials contend the money should have been earmarked and spent far sooner. Had that happened, they argue, the CPA could have retained much of the goodwill that existed among Iraqis after the U.S. invasion and possibly weakened the insurgency.
[....]
By starting late, the adviser said, the CPA got "caught in a security trap." More than $2 billion of the aid package will be spent hiring private guards for contractors, buying them armored vehicles and building secure housing compounds, CPA officials estimate. "If we had spent this money sooner, before things got bad, we could have spent more of it on actually helping the Iraqi people," the adviser said.

Because many of the 2,300 projects to be funded by the $18.6 billion are large construction endeavors that will involve foreign laborers instead of Iraqis, they will result in far less of a local economic boost than the CPA had promised, another senior official involved in the reconstruction said. The projects were chosen largely without input from Iraqis.

"This was supposed to be our big effort to help them -- 18 billion of our tax dollars to fix their country," the senior reconstruction official said. "But the sad reality is that this program won't have a lot of impact in it for the Iraqis. The primary beneficiaries will be American companies."



Clearly the security concerns have affected reconstruction efforts, though to the extent illustrated in the article, I was unaware. It’s is difficult to fault the CPA for having failed because to fail a substantial effort must have been undertaken. The CPA can’t even leave the Green Zone:

Life inside the high-security Green Zone -- what some CPA staffers jokingly call the Emerald City -- bears little resemblance to that in the rest of Baghdad. The power is always on. Shiny shuttle buses zip passengers around. Outdoor cafes stay open late into the night.

There is little effort to comply with Islamic traditions. Beer flows freely at restaurants. Women walk around in shorts. Bacon cheeseburgers are on the CPA's lunch menu.

"It's like a different planet," said an Iraqi American who has a senior position in the CPA and lives in the Green Zone but regularly ventures out to see relatives. "It's cut off from the real Iraq."

Because the earth-toned GMC Suburbans used by CPA personnel and foreign contractors have become a favored target of insurgents, traveling outside the Green Zone -- into the Red Zone that defines the rest of Iraq -- requires armored vehicles and armed escorts, which are limited to senior officials. Lower-ranking employees must either remain within the compound or sneak out without a security detail.
[...]
Limited contact with Iraqis outside the Green Zone has made CPA officials reliant on the views of those chosen by Bremer to serve on the Governing Council. When Brahimi, the U.N. envoy, asked the CPA for details about several Iraqis he was considering for positions in the interim government, he told associates he was "shocked to find how little information they really had," according to an official who was present.
The CPA official who got around the most was Bremer, who travels with an entourage of private guards, most of them former Navy SEALs, equipped with helicopters and a fleet of armored vehicles.


However, significant missteps by Bremer have led to poor training for the Iraq police and armed forces further exacerbating the security situation.

But if the CPA hasn’t been able to freely execute its duties, then quite certainly they are prepping for the transition to Embassy? The CPA will be wound down and re-branded as the American Embassy in Iraq, the world’s largest of its kind employing more than 3000 people. Thus the quality and the credentials of the employees at the soon to be new Embassy should reflect the diplomatic needs of the region, and hence the reconstruction. The project of rebuilding and reestablishing Iraqi infrastructure and democracy should be of integral priority and not be skewed by politics.

Andrew Zajac from the Chicago Tribune disabuses us of that notion. Appointments to the CPA have been highly political and little reported.

Although many CPA posts have been held by career government civil servants, numerous crucial slots have been filled by officials with strong GOP or conservative pedigrees. Passed over, in some cases, were diplomats and foreign policy specialists with backgrounds in Middle East issues or nation-building.

In less than two weeks, the CPA is scheduled to hand over power to an interim Iraqi government. The jobs of most of the authority's 1,200 employees will be eliminated or folded into a giant U.S. Embassy under construction in Baghdad. A few positions, like Bowen's fiscal oversight of the reconstruction effort, will be preserved.

It might be years before a final verdict is in on the CPA's stewardship of Iraq, and on whether the composition of the authority played a part in the outcome, for better or worse.

This really gives credence to the conspiratorial argument that war-profiteering may have been a driving aspect behind the Iraq war.

But already even some supporters of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq say the occupation's troubled course and the country's uncertain prospects for stable self-rule can be traced at least in part to a leadership team that valued political credentials over foreign policy expertise.

Occupation planners often selected "ideologues without international experience who see the world through blinders," said Peter Galbraith, a senior career diplomat and an adviser to the Iraqi Kurdish leadership.

"I don't think the Iraq venture was doomed to fail," Galbraith said. "If we had had qualified people with time to plan and a coherent strategy, the situation . . . would certainly be better."


In the most ironic passage of the piece, Michael Fleisher, brother to former Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, explains why crony patronage is bad:

Fleischer said he wanted to serve in Iraq because he believes Bush had embarked on "a noble path" in freeing and democratizing the country and he believed he had skills that would be helpful.

He said that from his Foreign Service stint, he was already acquainted with Paul Bremer, the presidential envoy who heads the CPA.

With an assist from his brother, Ari, who "got my resume to Bremer," Fleischer landed interviews that led to his appointment.

Among Fleischer's key tasks was training more Iraqi businessmen in the ways of U.S.-style procurement so they can land part of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction aid the U.S. has earmarked for Iraq.

Competitive bidding "is a new world for the Iraqis," Fleischer said. Under Saddam Hussein, "it was all done by cronies. The only paradigm they know is cronyism. We are teaching them that there is an alternative system with built-in checks and built-in review."


So the appointment of crucial members of the CPA is largely political. Not surprising. And the security situation in Iraq is still bad. Not surprising. That the reconstruction of Iraq isn’t going well is, I guess, not surprising. The White house, the NSC, and the Pentagon have disregarded the recommendations of the State Department to their own detriment. Troop level assessments; post war planning; managing expectations, ect, are among the areas the Bush administration failed to anticipate in the run up to war. Just imagine how much worse it could be if there wasn’t any criticism.

What America doesn't need is those who don’t think through the contingencies, don’t take into account alternative scenarios, and don’t manage properly the good will and financial aid of American citizens. The war in Iraq had, is having, and will have its benefits. But if the administration wants to start blaming someone for it’s failures in Iraq, it should take a look in the mirror.

Friday, June 18, 2004

More Questions Than Answers

More Questions Than Answers

With the Bush administration groping in the dark for ex post justifications for the Iraq war, a stunning revelation—or at least what would appear to be one—was brought to light. Speaking in Kazakhstan today, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russian intelligence had information of Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s intention to attack the US. Putin added:

After the events of September 11, 2001, and before the start of the military operation in Iraq, Russian special services several times received information that the official services of the Saddam regime were preparing 'terrorist acts' on the United States and beyond its borders
[. . .]
This information was passed on to our American colleagues


Saddam=Bin Laden=9/11

Cleary this should be the type of revelation that buttresses the Bush administration’s claim that Iraq was a gathering threat which needed to be pre-emptively stopped. Just days after the 9/11 commission concluded that al Qaeda had no collaborative links with Saddam Hussein and Iraq—though there were contacts between them which the commission notes—Putin’s claims serendipitously breath life back into the Administration's moribund pre-text for war. The Bush administration has for a long time attempted to insinuate—yet not literally; however the intention is the same—Saddam Hussein and Iraq to the tragic events of 9/11. There is no better example of this ‘guilty by insinuation’ than in the American public’s overwhelming belief that Saddam Hussein was behind 9/11, close to 70% percent of Americans have believed this at one time or another. This is where the 9/11 commission stands on this faulty today:

Our position has not changed. We indeed passed this information on to our American partners but we consider that there are rules, defined by international law, for using force in international affairs and these procedures were not observed.

“The international community will not hold a veto over the United States National security.” “The United States will act within in it own interest to protect it national sovereignty.” These are but a few of the proclamations the US made when they explained why they were acting pre-emptively against Iraq. If Russia had Intel that the US was going to be attacked and they indeed did pass it on to the US, then wouldn’t it only seem reasonable that the US should act to protect its national security, despite international protest? Russia could surely understand that the procedures of International Law not be observed because, again, and the “Intel” can’t stress this enough, Iraq was planning attacks on the US. How can someone make sense of these inconsistencies in Russia's position? They can’t because it doesn’t make sense.

But the Bush administration has some explaining to do, also.

If the US did, in fact, have this Russian Intelligence, then why didn’t they convey it to the American people and the world community? Undeniably, people would have been sympathetic and wholly accepting of the US’s right to defend itself. There would have been no anti-war movement—or rather, it would have been much smaller. It couldn’t have been a matter of revealing the source and, therefore, compromising Russian intelligence in Iraq, since if America attacked, Iraq would be no longer, thus there would be no need to cultivate intelligence sources with the Ba’athist under Saddam gone. But if it was a matter of protecting Russia as the source, then why not convey the intelligence in a manner that would have given anonymity to the Russians? Moreover, why would the national security interests of the US be compromised by withholding vital and credible intelligence?

Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc

In the run up to War no mention of this intelligence was cited. Could this be because this intelligence wasn’t actually passed on to the US? As I see it, this seems likely to be the case. So if the US was denied this crucial information—and the Bush Administration, as of this writing, has not commented on the revelation yet—it would put the Russia’s in a bad light. They had intelligence of impending attacks on the US by Iraq, yet withheld it from the US, all the while opposing the War, for more than unsavory reasons. That is completely despicable—not unexpected, but despicable. So maybe the intelligence is incredibly false. Iraq wasn’t ever going to attack the United States, and Russia was wrong.

But wait, it’s all in how you interpret the intelligence—if there is any. Was Iraq planning to attack the US before September 11, 2001 or after? Putin characterized the Intel as being acquired “After the events of September 11, 2001, and before the start of the military operation in Iraq”, which was around the time Iraq was placed on the Axis of Evil. It wasn’t until August of 2002 that the Administration stated, publicly, its intentions to topple Saddam Hussein—privately the machinations for toppling Saddam had begun in the summer of 2000, and picked up steam after 9/11.

Therefore for an entire year, as nearly 200,000 American and British troops began assuming military formations on the Saudi/ Iraqi border, Iraq knew that it was going to be attacked. Is it a stretch to surmise that Iraq, also, was drawing up a war strategy? It’s not. And it’s not moral equivalency to assert that Iraq was likely to draw up a war strategy, given that it was unlikely that Saddam would surrender. Could this dubious intelligence the Russians were so surreptitiously acquiring have been the Iraqi war strategy against a likely US attack? Yes. And wouldn’t US intelligence also be capable of ascertaining such information—if not predicting it in their battle plan? Consequently, if the US did indeed have this intelligence, then it certainly wasn’t that compelling to them at the time.

That is why I’m doubtful it should be so compelling to us now—post hoc.

Because it’s evident, from my assessment, that Iraq’s intention to attack the US was a consequence of the US’s intention to attack Iraq. Surely Iraq had always had the intention to be at war again with the US, as the US, illustrated by Clinton’s 1998 Los Angeles Times has a piece that questions the veracity of Putin’s intelligence claims. What’s interesting is the administration’s inability, thus far, to definitively say whether or not they actually received this specific intelligence:

Traveling with Bush aboard Air Force One on Friday, a White House spokeswoman said the U.S. had "ongoing cooperation with the Russians on a variety of matters, including intelligence matters," but she refused to discuss specifics.

. . .

State Department officials said they could not specify what the Russian intelligence indicated, but Adam Ereli, a deputy department spokesman, said the two countries "have a very good and close record of cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism."

However, most say, as I’ve already suggested, that Putin’s revelation is pure politics. But what escapes scrutiny is the substance of the claims Putin avers. The White House has yet to acknowledge what would be a significant boost to their rationale for war. That is why I assert, again, that the intelligence Putin speaks of is complete and utter garbage.

Wednesday, June 16, 2004

Deontology or Utilitarian: Same Difference?

Over at Foreign Dispatches the philosophical implications of gun-owner ship are considered. Apparently, an economic or utilitarian argument can be made for more gun-ownership, since it would reduce the frequency of “deadly, criminal incidences”; though, it hasn’t been determined whether the severity of these “deadly, criminal incidences” would increase, thus nullifying for now—and until substantial empirical evidence is shown—the utility of comprehensive public gun-ownership. A deontological argument concerning the social obligations we have to the public safety of society can, likewise, be made with the same force.

Public safety is the concern.

Surely I'm not the first to posit this-- actually I think I've read this argument somewhere else-- but either method, Utilitarian or Deontological, is, by whatever means, arriving at the same ends. Whether it be breaking a few eggs to make an omelet, restricting and closely controlling gun-ownership-- the deontological argument-- or stepping on fewer toes, though with quite possibly a greater level of damage, permissive gun ownership-- the Utilitarian argument—the structure is akin, and the economic and social analysis that is brought to bear in justify and implementing such methods is catholic.

Certainly the sensibilities of such positions differ, though the aim is chiefly identical: the greatest good. One speaks of the same thing when a deontological appraisal couches itself in the dry language of economic Utilitarianism. Utilitarian logic isn’t of a different kind than Deontological logic or even, as I would say, a different degree—rather it is of a different intonation.(maybe I’m babbling) Utilitarian arguments speak of the “fairness” of the collective good, just as Deontological arguments speak of the moral obligations of the “good”, or fairness.

The confusion arises when the action that should be taken conflicts with the proposed methods—the ends are the same: Public Safety. Moreover, empirical evidence to prove either positively or negatively the efficacy of a proposal remains elusive; at least from a generational perspective.
Crossfire

What happens when collegial political disagreement turns into vitriolic animus? Well, if you’ve ever wanted an illustrative answer to this question, you should simply tune into the CNN political free-for-all called Crossfire. In its new incarnation, Crossfire has rapidly devolved into a screaming match, pining dueling, crazed hot-heads against each other in what seems to be a battle to the death. Hardly shrinking violets, Tucker Carlson and James Carville have done great work in turning the once staid, cerebral political program into a third rate clown show.(Bob Novack and Paul Begala, the other hosts, are less brusque)

I would be speaking in tautologies if I said America has been polarized since the 2000 presidential election; but one must preface any explanations of excessive partisanship in the US with that irrefutable premise. America is greatly divided. This should explain the earnest tone being imbued into Crossfire.

Tucker Carlson, the erstwhile big-L libertarian, known for taking both Republicans and Democrats to task, has become a willing apparatchik of the GOP. This has placed him in some unsavory political alliances, for which his own political affiliation to Libertarianism is compromised—although, he’s been vocal in his criticisms of the Republican Medicare Bill and, also, the administration's strategy for Iraq, or lack thereof. But on virtually any other opportunity to raise a legitimate concern about Bush policy—be it the refusal to revisit, or expand, stem-cell research, or the ballooning budget deficit, or corporate welfare—Tucker speaks in sotto voce. His natural inclination to be a contrarian has been restrained, in his criticism of Bush Administration policy, and displaced, into his almost blind rage toward the Democratic Party.

Not to be out done, James Carville, famed political King-Maker and former Clintion campaign aide, has become as shrill as, if not more than, Tucker Carlson. You’ll often find Carville defending the indefensible and tirelessly skewering Bush as if it were a sport—but as of late, it has become the sport. Whether it’s filling in the holes of a Kerry foreign policy, or, with a straight face and in that signature southern drawl, asserting that the reformation and democratization of the Middle East has nothing to do with Iraq and, by extension, the War on Terror, Carville has turned the art of casuistry on its head.

Which brings to mind a new political aphorism in parlance: Just because President Bush believes it, doesn’t mean it’s not true.

Yet my grousing about what Crossfire has become isn’t at all fair. I enjoying watching the clown show for the sheer idiocy of seeing grown, intelligent men throw tantrums, among other things.(On today’s episode, Tucker threw, what appears to have been, a pencil at James, prompting James to throw it back. Unfortunately, the camera pulled away from the shot: what a shame.)

But I guess reasoned and substantive political debate on policy conveyed in a prosaic manner isn’t good TV. Crossfire, on the other hand, is good TV. The spectacle they have contrived over at CNN has created a new audience of rabid loonies looking for political analysis that’s delivered with a primal howl. I should know. I am one of those loons.

Thursday, June 10, 2004

Think The Unthunkable!

What in the past few months would have been unthinkable has now, paraphrasing the poignant words of Ezra Levant, publisher of the Western Standard, “been thunk [sic].”Though I’m sure think no longer or never had that tense, many can no longer deny the now natural thought, once inconceivable, of Stephen Harper as Prime Minister. CPAC (Canadian Political Affaires Channel) has had a rolling poll (daily) through out the campaign in which 600 hundred respondents are asked who their party of choice for government would be in the upcoming election. Some concerns about the poll’s methodology can be made, however, the general trend that is being found in more rigorous polls—i.e. Ipsos, Leger, Globe and Mail, and National Post—also appears in the CPAC polls: The Conservative's momentum is increasing. Only three weeks prior, The Liberals were polling nationally at around 38%, the Conservatives at 30% and the NDP at 16% or 17%. But now, the Conservatives are polling at 37% nationally and, also, in the province of Ontario, a traditionally Liberal stronghold. The Liberals are now polling around 32% to 33% in Ontario and nationally, appearing to be continual losing ground against the Conservatives. This is due in no small part to the recent Ontario budget tabled by the provincial Liberals, which has caused a furor against Liberal MP’s alike. That a Liberal loss on June 28th will weigh on the conscience of Dalton McGuinty, Premier of Ontario, is an ineluctable truth.

This was not always the case. Only a few weeks back many political commentators believed that, despite the Liberals deflating poll numbers, the Conservatives would hit the ceiling at 30% nationally. As the second week wore on, the Liberal campaign began to tear at the seams. The Liberal war-room made some egregious miscalculations, the first one being an invitation offer to Stephen Harper to attend the 60th anniversary D-Day ceremonies in France, Courseulles Sur-Mer. Harper, on principle, declined the offer, acknowledging that both the Prime Minister and the Governor General, as a matter of form, should represent Canada. This wasn’t at all unreasonable. Why would the leader of the opposition be invited to an event like this, or, for that matter, if the leader of the opposition was invited, why shouldn’t all the leaders of political parties in parliament be invited?

The Liberal war-room strategists were attempting to bear hug Harper in order to bring him into their political constellation. This, they assumed, would reflect well on Martin, and if Harper declined, stain the Conservatives. However, what it did, besides looking utterly pathetic, gave Stephen Harper all the power; moreover, his reason not to attend was, even for a political Liberal like myself, sound.

Another contemptible misstep by the Liberal war-room strategists was the organized ambush of Stephen Harper as he and his campaign team were mainstreeting (walking up and down streets shaking potential voters' hands). What made it inexcusable, and utterly pathetic, once again, was the fact that two cabinet ministers were sent to do the foot work. Judy Srgo, Minister of Immigration, and John Mcullam, Minister of Veterans Affairs—though I’m sure not for long—were tasked to do the thankless job of heckling Stephen Harper. John Mcullam, ever the social butterfly, came within inches of Harper’s face, attempting to hand him a letter, which Mr. Harper, rightly, didn't take.

At the end of the second week, the state of the Liberal campaign would have been rightly diagnosed terminal.

Therefore, the only recourse available to the Liberals, since there message hasn’t, as Liberal war-room chief strategist David Herle says, broken the “wall of cynicism”, is to go negative. Last night Liberal attacks ads appeared during the supper hour, with the sole purpose of souring the Canadian electorate’s taste for Stephen Harper. The ads target Harper’s agenda, which they believe is hidden, on social issues such as abortion, gay marriage, official bilingualism, and hate crime legislation—the prevailing thought is that Harper, and thus a Conservative government, would be against these issues, respectively. The rasion d’etre for the Liberals, now, is to define Harper as an intolerant, social conservative who will destroy the long, cherished principles of Canada: equality, inclusion, and multiculturalism.

Now to the pertinent electoral math: Today’s Ottawa Citizen has an article that predicts the seat count in the Conservative’s favor at 117. The Liberals have dropped to 112 since earlier counts had them between 118-125 seats. Since there are 308 seats in the House of Commons, and 155 is a majority government, it looks like neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals could form a majority government, today—though either of their fortunes could change after the candidates debate scheduled for next week. The Conservatives have broached the topic of forming a coalitional government with the BQ, who are projected to get 54 seats in the latest poll analysis. This is highly unlikely considering the diametrically opposed politics of both parties. The Liberals have also not ruled out forming a coalition with the NDP, who are projected to grab 24 seats; although this largely depends on whether or not the Liberals amass at least 130 seats.

It is convention for the Governor General to,failing that a majority of seats aren’t won by any party, ask the party with the most seats to form a coalition government. If the Conservatives won more seats than the Liberals yet still didn’t have enough for a majority, the Governor General would ask the Prime Minister, Paul Martin, to get a vote of confidence from parliament, which he clearly wouldn’t win, or resign as Prime Minister and allow the party with the most seats, the Conservatives, to form a coalitional government.

But now, if it seems like the Conservatives keep riding this implacable momentum with no clear policy objectives or platform, then it is, because they are—check their web site, it’s scant on policy; though the small fact of not having a policy convention is a contributing factor. The election is theirs to lose. However, once you do have momentum, it’s far too easy to lose it—just ask Paul Martin.

Wednesday, June 09, 2004

Exit Paul Martin Stage Left.

Dateline-5:45 pm- Wednesday, June 9, 2004.

As I write, the political machinations of the worst political defeat for a sitting government are underway—maybe not as bad as the Progressive Conservatives in 93’; but bad nonetheless. Frantically hammering away at my battery operated laptop—it shouldn’t be battery operated; I’m inside next to a power outlet—I’m attempting to figure out what this power-outage is going to do the Federal Liberals. Yes, I said power outage! What’s that you say, “In Ontario, again?” Damn Skippy! So what now? Admittedly, one must verify whether or not this outage is simply a brown-out, affecting only local areas, or a full scale black out, similar to l’affaire Northeastern American Black Out, of last summer.

Correct that: Only local areas, mine, are being affected by this small scale, if entirely insignificant, power-outage. On a micro level, David McGuinty, younger brother of reviled Premier Dalton, is the Liberal candidate for MP in this ridding and faces an uphill battle with voters angry over the new Ontario Health premiums brought in by his older brother.

I have two different takes on this: a)either voters in this constituency look at this power outage, and this is all contingent on its duration, as part in parcel of the broken promise Liberals: recall the prior summer when Liberals blamed the PC’s for degrading Ontario Hydro and promising to mange it better. Or, b) realizing how poorly stewarded public utilities were managed under the PC’s, voters sympathize with the type of job the Liberals have on their hands. I’m of the opinion that the Liberals, both provincial and federal, are screwed either way. The writing is on the wall; though I wish it weren’t. More on this later

Monday, June 07, 2004

Reagan Dies

After hearing the news of Ronald Reagan’s death, I was stirred with conflicting emotions. First, I reflected on what a tragic end it might have been for Nancy to watch Ronald deteriorate into an abyss of nothingness, debilitated by Alzheimer's . Second, I recalled what had been those nascent moments of my youth when, being all too naïve, I held a partial affinity for President Regan. And now, it is being revealed that Mr. Regan was, in fact, a man of letters, and a closet intellectual, to boot. Indeed, at the time of his Presidency I was much too young to appreciate his biting witticism and his charming manner;but, still, there was an endearing quality about him that transcended age. Reagan was also a cut-up and had incredible comic timing, honing his skills during his time as an actor in Hollywood.

Nevertheless, when I came of age and became more familiar with the politics, history, and economics of the 20th century, I was nettled by the social and economic realities of Reagan’s domestic policies. Despite his assiduous and vital efforts to bring about the end of Soviet Communism and the Cold War, I can’t help but to cringe when I asses his domestic policy: Reagenomics—or more loosely, supply side economics—which championed massive tax cuts and increased military spending nearly sunk the federal treasury. Regan was steadfast in his vision of smaller government, attempting, many thought, to efface the role of government created by FDR’s New Deal, Truman’s Fair Deal, and LBJ’s Great Society.

Far from lifting America up, Reagenomics shifted the tax burden more onerously on the middle class; deregulated natural public trusts that where now free, as private entities, to flout public health and employment standards; created the largest deficit in US history; and brought levels of unemployment unseen since the great depression—this isn’t even to speak of the staggeringly high rates of inflation, which had serious implications both domestically and internationally.

Yet, knowing all this, it’s difficult not to admire the man. Holding so strongly to his personal convictions, Regan literally willed himself to 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. If nothing else, as I see it, Ronald Reagan is a testament to the historical fact that individuals do matter. Never can it be said that the historical progression of events and circumstances are beyond the grasp and will of individuals: Individuals matter. And Ronald Reagan was a historical personality that, regardless of your political affiliation, mattered—but, as an aside, this isn’t such a bold statement because he was, after all, the President of the United States

Saturday, June 05, 2004

Tectonic Optimism

Andrew Coyne has this hyper-ventilating analysis on the recent IPSOS/Globe/CTV poll that has the Conservatives up in Ontario:

This is a historic development, years in the making but perhaps now coming to fruition: Ontario is joining the West. The line dividing West and East in Canada is no longer at the lakehead. It's at the Rideau

Easy! The language is far too convulsing and onanistic. Bliss’s thesis has been resoundingly dissembled as regard a “New Canada”. Further, Coyne would be remiss to not mention a puny, little variable that is engendering all this reversal of fortunes: The pristine Liberal brand name is in denouement. The vicissitudes of prolonged electoral dominance, in the end, will determine whether the Liberals will lose. It is said that governments essentially defeat themselves, and this seems clearly the case for the Liberals. That a political transmogrification is, or will, occur is a gleefully, irrational exuberance of Panglossian proportions. The people have no choice!
Pain As A Metaphor

Last night I happened upon an interesting show on CBC radio, as I lay down to rest after reading. The CBC show Ideas, hosted by Phillip Coulter, was having a three part series on the Culture of Pain, which I thought, at the time, to be an intriguing ‘idea’. Having already missed the first part, I had to fill in the conceptual gap as I listened to part two: an interview with cultural philosopher, David Morris. The interview went from the absurd to the asinine to the completely incomprehensible, with in minutes. The physical and biomedical explanations of pain could be dissolved away, Morris alleged, as ideological artifacts of culture. If one could control the construction of the physical explanation of pain, one could control and offer an alternative account of that pain: I must objectify my pain. I must attribute a narrative to this ineffable feeling of pain; this way, I’ll be able to live with and appreciate the pain.

David Morris, author of The Culture of Pain, contends that far too often in our post-modern world—though he sees this as a lingering dogma of modernism, circa. 1860-1950—we medicalize pain. More clearly, we determine, through forms of medical classification, the types of pain that inhere in the biomedical constitution of humanity. If I were to experience a pain in my hand as result of injury, then quiet possibly, aside from it having a physical explanation, it may exist as a phenomenon without biomedical explanation—or as Morris states, “an alternative narrative.” Morris then goes on to opine that narrative forms of therapy need be explored, since they may offer alternative methods of alleviating pain.

Biblical examples are cited of the narrative catharsis of articulating pain allegorically; most chiefly, the Book of Job. Job, a good man, endures harrowing pain through out his life, and is led to question the meaning of life. A part of the Old Testament, the Book of Job illustrates the significance of suffering in Christianity, and the providence of God to give meaning to suffering and, finally, in eschatology, give salvation for suffering. Morris appears to imply that the re-mythologizing of pain may offer a qualitatively different approach to how we both explain and treat pain. Such a postulate, if I’m reading it correctly, veers dangerously close to the moralizing superstition of religious explanation of pain: sin. No longer have I simply torn my ACL, but now I’m meant to suffer a metaphorical pain because I live in sin. Further, my physical pain is a symptom of an ethereal flaw of my conscience life.

Of the physical manifestations of pain, Morris concedes that our scientific medicalizations of explanations of pain are, and have been, systematic and fruitful, though, at the same time, sees the need for an expansive awareness of the non-physical explanations that include cultural variables. Using lung cancer as an example, Morris claims that postmodernist language explains pain more comprehensively than the stock medicalization. He posits that the “archeology of biomedical explanations” don’t take into account other salient variables such as advertising, corporatist manipulation, culture and whatnot when explaining lung cancer.

Huh? Whaaa?

Yes, this is a postmodernist expounding on the issue of pain, and somehow lung cancer can have a hermeneutic variance with Scientism rigidity. It must be noted that Morris is only speaking of alternative narratives, however. He does not think, thankfully, that modern medical classification of pain should be abandoned. Moreover, he takes comfort in the marvels of modern medical science to alleviate pain—whether it be of the narrative variety, or, quiet simply, the physical form.

Saturday, May 29, 2004

A Common Sense Hangover

The recent Budget tabled by the Ontario Liberal government has caught the politically uninformed off-guard. Throughout the province angry Ontarians are ready to take Mr. Guinty to task for what they see as an egregious breach of trust. One man even went so far as to send a strongly worded email—flagrantly, harassing hate-mail—to Mr. McGuinty, quickly resulting in the man’s arrest. It is doubtless, though, that many Ontarians are restraining their distaste for this budget until the June 28th Federal election. So what is it exactly that has raised the ire of so many Ontarians? Well, for one, Dalton McGuntiy misled the electorate when he said that he wouldn’t raise taxes. Also, the change Ontario voters chose apparently came at too high of a price than they were willing to stomach. But the skeptical onlooker would wryly rejoined, “Why is this news? Weren’t voters paying attention to this before the election?” Likewise, the seasoned cynic would demur, “Come’ on people, pay attention”.

In not necessarily an about face, the Liberals have implemented new health care premiums that will re-infuse $2.2 billion back into Ontario’s beleaguered Health Care System. Somehow Ontarians were under the impression that reinvesting back into our social treasures of Education and Health would be without no personal sacrifice. One must concede, though, that Dalton McGuinty offered a slightly redacted version of his vision of Ontario during the election when he promised not to raise taxes. However, if one were so inclined to read his lips carefully during the election, one would have caught the essential esoteric meaning: personal income taxes won’t be increased, though, user fees, premiums, increases in licensing, ect, will be introduced. This form of indirect taxes isn’t, within the letter of his intent—the literal meaning—an increase in personal income taxes. But within the spirit of his intent, and the commonly construed public understanding of it, an increase in indirect taxes is clearly a breach of trust.

Yet, considering the $5.6 billion deficit McGuntiy inherited from the out-going Harris/Eves government, these measures are vital to the education and health policy the Ontario Liberals hope to implement. The Ontario Liberals came to power because Ontario voters voted against the Harris/Eves Conservative record. For them, the Common Sense Revolution amounted to a self-inflicted wound that put into disrepair Ontario’s Educational, Health, and Public infrastructure. The economic prosperity Ontario underwent during the Common Sense revolution was incompetently squandered by the Tories, and in the end Ontarians were left with a $5.6 billion bill, and a nasty hangover. Though it may pain them, Ontarians must come to the sobering realization that social programs cost money, and if you’re not willing to gin up then don’t complain about health care and education when the Tories cut social spending to fund your tax cuts; because when they inevitably do, you should start looking for alternative(viz. private) forms of education and health services, to augment what will most certainly become Ontario’s weak public health and education services.

A May 22 article in The Globe and Mail by Murray Campbell speaks to these concerns. Referring to Finance Minister Greg Sorbara, the article reads:

He acknowledged that the Liberals' fiscal promises were a "small but important part" of their election campaign, but argued that the party was elected primarily because it promised to re-invest in government programs that had been cut back during eight years of Progressive Conservative rule.

Further underscoring the necessity of the measures taken, Sorbara concludes:

"The strongest mandate coming out of the campaign was for improvements in public services," he said. He noted that a Conservative campaign that argued for lower taxes and continued spending restraint had been "soundly rejected" by voters

Despite the noble intentions of the Ontario Liberal government, this budget will have an adverse political effect on the electoral fortunes of the Federal Liberals come election time. Already reeling from the sponsorship scandal, compounded by waning brand credibility, this budget may inflict an irrevocable body blow to the ailing Federal Liberals. As Ontarians dizzily awake to today's political realities, and the Common Sense Hangover sets in, poor, reactionary political choices will be made, and for this the Federal Liberals will suffer dearly. But, then again, that’s nothing new.



Friday, May 28, 2004

Apathy, Shmapathy

With the writ dropped, Canadians are gearing up for a June 28th election date, with all the verve of a retarded lounge singer. Special election coverage by the networks is abound, as the politicians position themselves to appeal to the inquisitive electorate—whether they number in the tens of thousands, or simply in the hundreds. Most Canadians have their attention directed to the Stanley Cup, and rightfully so: The Calgary Flames are making their first appearance since 1989. In fact, the Flames are the first Canadian team in the last 10 years to be in the Finals; the last Canadian team was Vancouver in 1994. So for at least the next two weeks, the news, despite being replete with vital political information, will largely be ignored—that is of course until the Flames win the Cup.

Nonetheless, don’t be surprised by all the insipid political forums that “want” to increase youth political awareness and engagement. As far as I’m concerned, youth political engagement is a risible oxymoron. The plaintive moans of youth activists who complain that politicians ignore their demands have become a tired refrain. Calls for political reform, both electoral and institutional, have fallen on deaf ears. The argument goes: the youth don’t vote because they have no vested interest to vote. This should come as no shock to both the politically literate and the politically illiterate: the youth have no vested interest insofar as they have no political and generational capital to effect political change. Admittedly, they should be concerned as regards educational policy, especially those in any form of post-secondary institution. Though, It would be nonsensical to have youth effect change to educational policy simply because we need more youthful political engagement.

We have experts for a reason; experts have experience for a reason. Just as anyone would prefer an informed opinion when assessing a situation, one should also seek an informed vote when engaging the political process.

Youth participation in the electoral process is punctuated by the amount of comfort, knowledge, and experience they bring to the table. I would much rather that someone, of any age group, decide not to vote because of lack of comfort, lack of knowledge, and lack of experience, than someone quixotically voting uniformed, just because they can.

Thus far, the term youth has been used ambiguously, to refer to youth in general; though the term must be explained more specifically to what I contend it to mean in a demographic sense. From heretofore, youth will refer to those under the age of 26, who may still be in some form of post-secondary education or already in the work field—though a difference of degree may separate those youth who work and those who are still in school. My basic point is that those youth with no vested interest in tax policy and regional issues are less likely to be affected and appealed to by politician, more specifically politicians in their constituency. The point couldn’t be put any simpler: You vote for the Member of Parliament in your riding, not the leader of the political party you want to win. Likewise, with the high mobility of youth in post-secondary education—who appear to be the group more likely to be politically apathetic—no grounding, regional experience will engage them. Not working in the area, but for months, and having little to no property commitments will generally dictate the level of engagement one has with their surroundings. This, undoubtedly, translates to one’s political engagement in the region.

Historical perspective also illustrates this point clearer. The introduction of universal male suffrage, during the tail-end of the 19th century, had much to do with the electoral inequality of having only propertied elites dictate legislation to all. Many felt that because of taxation, which fell on each male, they needed to be politically represented: No Taxation without representation.

The political term “voter apathy” wasn’t yet in parlance because people demanded franchise, and willingly participated in the process.

Greater measures to expand suffrage to women and blacks inaugurated a rights revolution that saw the disbanding of old institutions of discrimination. The universal voting age was also lowered to 18 from 21 in the 1970’s. Though foolish, one legislator in California, just this year, has proposed a bill that would lower the voting age to 14, effectively giving 14 year olds half votes.

Today, the ethos of political engagement has not changed, considerably—though voter turn out in the western industrial countries has declined precipitously since the 1980’s. Many believe this has more to do with economic stability of liberal democracies, than a general erosion of the political process—though the point can be made, and it has been, forcefully, by some, that corporate, political party financing has changed the dynamic. The corporate infiltration into the political process is a point not to be lightly disregarded, and more needs to be said of that influence.

But my essential misgiving is with the argument that the youth aren’t politically engaged because of a failure of the system. Once youth exceed the age of 26, develop roots to a region, and begin paying substantially into the tax system, then a natural and vital engagement with the political variables that affect their lifestyles will manifest. This is not to say that all over the age of 26 are more politically engaged than those under 26; however, a greater proportion of those over 26 have a greater reason to be politically engaged, than those under 26. No representation without taxation or, from a modern perspective, no reason to care about representation because I don’t necessarily pay a lot of taxation.

Youth today aren’t as politically engaged as some would desire, yet this seems to be more a symptom of their experiential situation than necessarily a fatal flaw of the political system.

Monday, May 10, 2004

Extreme Think-Over

With shows like Extreme Makeover, The Swan, and I Want A Celebrity Face permeating mainstream popular culture, and shamefully gracing the hapless networks, the issue of surgical enhancement has taken center stage in our relentless quest for self-perfection. Some Botox here, a chin tuck there, plus facial reconstructive surgery here, a new wardrobe, and I'm ready to begin my new life—this isn’t even taking into account the necessary cognitive therapy to assume my new persona.

Even meek, moralistic Canadians are rushing to their plastic surgeons in record numbers. In 2003, the number of Canadians going in for a surgical enhancement procedure increased by 30% from the pervious year.

Indeed, shows like The Swan reflect rather than create or instruct the growing trend toward more surgical enhancement; and, insofar as these shows sensitize and sanitize our previously temperate attitudes toward surgical enhancement, they also cultivate and intensify an atmosphere that regards such activities as socially acceptable and, more importantly, normal.

Therefore, what is interesting is how the public dialogue has pushed the moral concerns closer to the fringes. No longer is it taboo to consider surgical enhancement: a scared cow has been tipped—at least partially. As a matter of personal choice and self-improvement, what essentially is the moral difference between exercise and surgical enhancement? To be fair, the physical differences are scant when taking into account the physiological enchantment of exercise. Thus, surgical enhancement's primary goal, apart from the visible modification, is the notion that visible modification will benefit you physiological, or more specifically: it makes you feel better about your-self. One exercises for the physical and mental benefits; surgical enhancement offers these same ends—though with much less effort.

But the negative opinions still persist. Why is this?

It may simply be that surgical enhancement is a relativity effortless form of self improvement, and that people—viz. rich people—will eventually buy their way to beauty and social prominence (like they haven't already). Soci-economic disparities generally predicate the way in which employment opportunities are distributed. On top of this, it is widely accepted, and shown through numerous studies, that preferential treatment is disproportionately given to good looking people.

Therefore, a strong argument for surgical enhancement can be made on the grounds that but for surgical enhancement the livelihood of a not so good looking person would suffer. If one has the means and the desire, then why not enhance her or his professional and personal livelihood through surgical enhancement?

This, of course, raises ethical implications in our public and social policy mechanisms. Though economic accessibility still remains a barrier to the equality of surgical enhancement opportunities, a comprehensive study of the systemic flaws in contemporary social and political arrangements, which is far beyond the scope of this post, would explore the issue more adequately. Yet, remaining pragmatic on this issue appears to be the only sane position at this point

Tuesday, May 04, 2004

Not So Shocked and Appalled

News of Iraqi prisoners being tortured, humiliated, and degraded struck me rather oddly, to say the least. I was truly unable to emote the sort of standard outrage that usually occasions news of this type. To say that my indifference borders on callous would be fair; though, it must be noted, the news wasn’t surprising to me. I tend to generally hold the U.S to a very low standard when it comes to upholding the Geneva Convention (GC)—to be honest I hold every country that has engaged in any type of warfare/military operation within the last 20 years to a lower standard, if for no other reason than they were in warfare. It’s quite easy to follow the dictates of the GC when you’re not engaged in a military operation. It’s even easier when you not providing security and stability for the country you’re not occupying.

Therefore when I heard that six military police (MP’s) humiliated and degraded Iraq prisoners, I thought to myself, “I wonder what’s not being reported?” My lack of moral outrage frightens me sometimes—as it likely should the reader—since such heinous acts should be met with moral opprobrium everywhere.

To be frank, this speaks more to my growing cynicism of political language and rhetoric, than to my growing depravity in general—although I wouldn’t necessarily discount the later.

The “the facts on the ground” are certainly far worse than is reportable or palatable to the general public. One can only imagine—and it shouldn’t be difficult to do so—the types of criminal activities US soldiers engage in with sheer impunity. There is clearly no greater power militarily than the US in the region and, likewise, clearly no other organization able to legally reprimand or sanction the US. But, the US, already struggling to win the “Hearts and Minds” of the Iraqis, has blundered in a huge way. Managing perceptions and expectations of transforming US force into a benevolent fount seemed near impossible; but, now it is a lot closer to being empirically impossible.

Opponents of the Iraqi war are now realizing all their previous predictions and checking off their laundry list of catastrophic outcomes the occupation would produce. It is doubtless the Bush Administration was overly—even criminally— optimistic when it came to making the case for war; and now their eating crow. But to be fair, their detractors shouldn’t feel contented about their pre-war predictions. As far as I see it, these outcomes were a fait accompli.

These are the facts: guerrilla warfare has broken out in the cities and is fomenting the type of alienation necessary to make regular Iraqis question the continued presence of US troops; fundamentalist clerics fearful of losing territorial authority are usurping provisional government authority in the region, desperately holding on to what little power they have left; in the commission of military security, the US has detained prisoners and either humiliated, degraded, or tortured them. These things were all bound to happen, and they have all come to fruition. It wasn’t a matter of if these things could happen, but rather when these things would happen. This is why I wasn’t surprised when I heard of the tortures. I’m saving my moral outrage for something else.

Wednesday, April 21, 2004

A Long Hard One

Either way you slice it, the US has a serious problem on its hands with Iraq. After a tumultuous month, the Administration is quickly moving to acquire more UN assistance. With the June 30th hand-over date on the horizon, and no let up in insurgent attacks, it appears that securing a workable mandate with the UN won't necessarily matter in the short-run.

Despite wails of consternation from Bush detractors to internationalize the occupation of Iraq, the UN has been hesitant to step in at any capacity since the bombing of its headquarters in Iraq last August. Some months back, Kofi Annan deplored the UN's lack of risk assement and preparedness in Iraq that led to the bombing that killed 22 and wounded 150. Seeking desperately to change the optics, the Bush Administration has tasked U.N. diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi to handle the process of power transfer by June 30th.

Another battle the US faces is keeping coalition members in the coalition. Spain and Honduras have decided to move their troops out earlier than expected, yet their military presence in Iraq-- not to demean-- was, and is, very small and ineffectual. The US hasn't really made a rile about losing these members of the "coalition of the willing", which should speak to how valuable their contributions really were.

Nonetheless, even if the Bush Administration is shifting its policy-- be it from lack of alternatives, or because of political imperatives and strategic necessities-- the attacks by insurgents still continue. If anything, the presence of more troops will only embolden insurgent and guerilla efforts. In addition, the sophistication of the attacks seem to be increasing, and an unweilding response by US forces to these attacks will only cause unavoidable civilian causalities-- further exacerbating US relations with moderates.

An interesting point, though, that goes unmentioned, is the characterization of these latest uprisings in Fulluja and Najaf as insurgent uprising, rather than terror related. The term terrorist has been dropped from White House parlance with regard to Iraq lately; though just today their seems to have been car bombings in Iraq killing 68 people which may be related to foreign terrorist.

What the Bush Administration is certainly doing right now is working the back channels of negotiation with moderate clerics like Sistani, in an attempt to mollify these uprisings. Short of precise tactical weapons to extricate these insurgents, the US has to negotiate to maintain a level of civility just to start talks. Sustained attacks against the insurgents hold up in civilian areas will prove to be extremely counter productive in the long run.

Therefore, though internationalizing the occupation of Iraq is a wise, if far a too late, move by the Bush Administration, the larger problem is regaining stability within the region. This requires propping up credible public arbiters, Sistani being one, and removing all appearances of an engineered occupation (Iraq governing Council-IGC). Likewise, other substantive measures should be taken, but the optics must be changed aswell. This will be even tougher to do, now, with the new US super embassy in Iraq headed by John Negroponte. The embassy will have a staff of 3000 thousand people, the largest in the world, and control the administrative apparatus of Iraq—overseeing the IGC, but that’s a whole other story. Right now it looks like its going to be a “long, hard slog.”

Monday, April 19, 2004

ELECTORAL COLLUSION

The Saudi Ambassador to the U.S, Prince Bandar, is said to have assured Bush that oil prices would be down before the November election. The effort would be to increase Saudi oil production by 1 to 2 million barrels a day thus lowering the per/bbl price to around $28 US-- as of this writing, light sweet crude is going for $36.75 US per/bbl. Low gas prices and a rosey economic picture could help Bush get re-elected. However, having this little tidbit of information as part of the public discourse before the election is a huge political liability. One way the Bush Administration could pre-empt criticism, or allay suspicions, would be to get Bandar to start pumping up oil production now; though that would only confirm the suspicions of collusion. The story is already in the news cycle, but the question is whether it will have any legs. This, from Joshua Marshall at TPM, is how they're handling it:[Transcript]

QUESTION: Can you describe conversations between the White House and Prince Bandar about his essential promise to lower oil prices before the election?
MR. McCLELLAN: I think you heard from Prince Bandar a few weeks ago about --

QUESTION: He didn’t talk specifically about the election.

MR. McCLELLAN: -- the most recent conversation that we had with him regarding oil prices. And he expressed his views out at the stakeout to you all that Saudi Arabia is committed to making sure prices remained in a range, I believe it’s $22 to $28 price per barrel of oil, and that they don’t want to do anything that would harm our consumers or harm our economy. So he made those comments at the stakeout and we’ve made our views very clear that prices should be determined by market forces, and that we are always in close contact with producers around the world on these issues to make sure that actions aren’t taken that harm our consumers or harm our economy.

QUESTION: There were no conversations specifically about the President’s reelection?

MR. McCLELLAN: You can ask Prince Bandar to --

QUESTION: But from the point -- I mean, conversations are obviously two ways.

MR. McCLELLAN: -- what his comments were. But the conversations we have are related to our long-held views that we have stated repeatedly publicly, that market forces should determine prices.

QUESTION: To follow up on that then, I would gather that the White House view is one of expectation that the Saudis would increase oil production between now and November.

MR. McCLELLAN: Our views are very well-known to Saudi Arabia. Prince Bandar made a commitment at the stakeout that I will let speak for itself. You all should look back to those remarks.

QUESTION: We’re missing the allegation here, which is that Prince Bandar and the Saudis have made a commitment to lower oil prices to help the President politically. Is that your --

MR. McCLELLAN: I’m not going to speak for Prince Bandar. You can direct those comments to him. I can tell you that what our views are and what he said at the stakeout is what we know his views are, as well.

QUESTION: Does the White House have any knowledge of such a commitment?

MR. McCLELLAN: I’m sorry?

QUESTION: Does the White House have any knowledge of such a commitment?

MR. McCLELLAN: Again, I’m not going to speak for Prince Bandar. You can direct those questions --

QUESTION: Is there a deal?

MR. McCLELLAN: -- I wouldn’t speculate one way or the other. You can direct those questions to him, but I’m telling you --

QUESTION: I’m not asking you to speculate either. Do you have knowledge of such a commitment?

MR. McCLELLAN: I’m telling you what our views are and what we've stated, and I'm telling you what I do know, which is that our position is very clear when it comes to oil prices and what our views are. And Prince Bandar spoke to you all just a few weeks ago out at the stakeout after meeting with some White House officials and expressed --

QUESTION: So you have no knowledge of such a commitment?

MR. McCLELLAN: -- and expressed their view. I'm not going to try to speak for Prince Bandar. You can direct those questions to him.

QUESTION: The President is confident that the American elections are not being manipulated by the world's largest oil producer?

MR. McCLELLAN: Our view is that the markets should determine --

QUESTION: The market doesn't. It's a cartel.

MR. McCLELLAN: But our view is that that's what -- that the markets should determine prices. And that's the view we make very clear to producers around the world, including our friends in OPEC.